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We present a dynamic deontic logic for specifying and reasoning about complex contracts.
The concepts that our contract logic CL captures are drawn from legal contracts, as we
consider that these aremore general and expressive thanwhat is usually found in computer
science (like in software contracts,web services specifications, or communicationprotocols).
CL is intended to be used in specifying complex contracts found in computer science. This
influences many of the design decisions behind CL. We adopt an ought-to-do approach to
deontic logic and apply the deontic modalities exclusively over complex actions. On top,
we add the modalities of dynamic logic so to be able to reason about what happens after
an action is performed. CL can reason about regular synchronous actions capturing the
notion of actions done at the same time. CL incorporates the notions of contrary-to-duty and
contrary-to-prohibition by attaching to the deontic modalities explicitly a reparation which
is to be enforced in case of violations. Results of decidability and tree model property are
given as well as specific properties for the modalities.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The present paper reports on the state-of-the-art of the logic for contracts CL. The goal of CL is to describe and prescribe,
at an abstract level, behaviors of complex systems, as for instance concurrent programs, communicating intelligent agents,
web services, or normative systems. From this point of view, CL needs to be expressive enough to capture behaviors of such
systems. The purpose of this logic is not only to formalize such behaviors, but also to reason about them. Therefore, we
aim at a decidable logic so to have hopes for automatic verification using formal tools like model-checking and run-time
monitoring.
More precisely, CL has been designed to represent and reason about contracts (being that software contracts, web
services, interfaces, communication protocols, etc.), and it combines deontic logic (i.e., the logic of obligations, permissions,
and prohibitions) [50] with propositional dynamic logic (PDL, the logic of actions) [16]. The deontic part of CL can express
obligations, permissions and prohibitions over structured actions, as well as what happenswhen obligations or prohibitions
are not respected. The dynamic part of CL expresses what happens after some action (possibly with complex structure) is
performed.
A first version of the language CL has been presented in [38], where explicit temporal operators (always, eventually,
and until) were part of the syntax. An encoding into a version of the modal μ-calculus with concurrent actions was used
to give semantics. The CL language presented in this paper is more expressive and has a cleaner syntax (with no syntactic
restrictions); it was first introduced in [39]. A variant of CL (without the propositional constants) was used in [23] for doing
run-time monitoring of electronic contracts using a restricted semantics based on traces of actions. This semantics was
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specially designed for monitoring the actions of the contracting parties at run-time with the purpose of detecting when
the contract is violated. The presentation of [23] did not give much explanation nor examples about the intuitions behind
the choices in the design of CL. We do this in the present paper and discuss the full semantics of CL based on normative
structures. We focus on the intended properties of the language. This paper is a revised and extended version of [39], where
besides presenting full proofs we have the following added contributions: (i) a complete new section on results concerning
the underlying action algebra of CL, (ii) new results concerning the decidability of the logic, and (iii) further results on its
semantics.
In the rest of this introductory section we focus on the informal explanation of the language and in particular on its
design decisions. These design decisions are biased by the fact that CL is intended to faithfully capture concepts and natural
properties from electronic contracts and to avoid the main deontic paradoxes.
1.1. Motivation and design decisions
In this section we motivate the particular choices we made in the design of the CL contract specification language. We
compare to related works and give informal intuitions and examples.
The design of CL and specially its semantics is driven by the need to express and reason about contracts.More particularly,
CL needs to talk about obligations, permissions and prohibitions; but more specific, about actions and the fact that such
actions are obligatory, permitted or forbidden. Actions abound in contracts, (particularly in legal contracts) as for example:
“supply false information”, “notify”, or “pay later”. CL isworking at a rather high level of abstraction andmanyof the details of
the actions are abstracted away. In fact, much of the open problems and possible continuations for the CL logic are gathered
around making such details of actions explicit and accounted for in a richer logic. 1
Because CL talks about obligations applied to actions it can be included in the class of logics that take the so called
ought-to-do approach to deontic logic. But more than this, CL needs to talk aboutwhat happens after some action, like in the
example “after notification he must...”. Such notions are captured with the PDL part of CL.
Ultimately CL is a logic which talks about complex actions because actions can have some more structure than just
simple names like “pay”, “delay”, or “drive”. The minimal structure that appears in most contracts is: sequencing of actions,
where one must do an action and then do another action, like “lower the Internet traffic and then pay”; and another kind
of structuring is choices, like “one has the choice to pay with either euro or dollars”. The structure that is particular to CL
is that of actions done at the same time, which are typically found in everyday contracts, as for example “drink and drive”
or paraphrasing from our example above “delay and notify”. Our understanding of such concurrent actions and the way to
abstract them in a logic is through the concurrency notion or synchrony. The integration of all these features is not trivial
and was done in an algebraic formalism in [37]. We summarize the main results needed for the present paper in Section 2.
In what follows we describe some related work.
We adopt a deontic logic over actions, as started by vonWright [49], and integrates these deontic operators with the PDL
modality. In this sense CLmight be thought of entering the line of dynamic deontic logics as started by Meyer [26], but this
is not the case as in CL the deontic modalities are not expressed in terms of the PDL modality (or in terms of the modal
μ-calculus [6]). But still CL has both dynamic and deontic flavor.
CL integrates a notion of concurrent actions (i.e., the synchrony) and in this respect it intersects with both works from
PDL with concurrent actions and with works in the dynamic deontic logic community.
Another important notion in legal contracts is that of a reparation sentence which is somehow directly related to the
obligation or prohibition that it repairs. This is somehow related to the well known problem of contrary-to-duty, but in CL
we are in the setting of actions and not in that of standard deontic logic. In CL the standard notion of contrary-to-duty takes
a flavor of reparations enforced after the violating actions.
The purpose of CL is to specify and reason about contracts, therefore it integrates the normative notions of obligation,
permission, and prohibition. These have been extensively investigated in the deontic logic community since its introduction
by von Wright in [50]. The deontic notions that we introduce in CL are different than the ones in standard deontic logic
(SDL) in several respects, as discussed in the rest of this section.
(1) The deontic modalities are applied only over actions instead of over propositions (or state of affairs). This is known
as the ought-to-do approach to deontic logic as opposed to the more classic ought-to-be approach of SDL. The ought-to-do
approach has been advocated by von Wright [49] which argued that deontic logic would benefit from a “foundation of
actions”, since many of the philosophical paradoxes of SDL would then not occur; a point which is made clear and precise in
[27]. Important contributions to this approachwere done by Segerberg for introducing actions inside the deontic modalities
[43,44] and by the seminal work of Meyer on dynamic deontic logic (DDL) [26] (see also [6,51]).
Compared to [6,10,26,47], which also consider deontic modalities (i.e., O, P, and F) applied over actions, the investigation
presented in this paper at the level of the actions is different in several ways as we elaborate below. The formalization of
the actions is summarized in Section 2 and thoroughly investigated in [37] where standard models are defined for actions
and completeness results are established. The semantics of the CL language is based on this interpretation of the actions as
special trees.
1 For more open problems and research directions see [36].
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(2) Theactioncombinators are the standard+and · (for choiceand sequence) but exclude theKleene star ∗. This exclusion
is only for the actions appearing inside the deontic modalities (i.e., the deontic actions); for otherwise we allow the Kleene∗ inside the dynamic box modality as is standard (as see in Section 4). None of the few papers that consider repetition (e.g.,
using ∗) as an action combinator under deontic modalities [6,47] give a convincing motivation for having such recurring
actions inside obligations, permissions, or prohibitions. In fact its use inside the deontic modalities seems counter-intuitive:
take the expression O(α∗) – which, using for now our intuition for the Kleene ∗ and the obligation modality O, is read “One
is obliged to not pay, or pay once, or pay twice in a row, or...” – which puts no actual obligations; or take P(α∗) – “One has
the right to do any sequence of action α” – which is a very shallow permission and is captured by the widespread Closure
Principle in jurisprudence where what is not forbidden is permitted [43]. Moreover, as pointed out in [6], expressions like
F(α∗) and P(α∗) can be simulated with the propositional dynamic logic (PDL) modalities along with deontic modalities
over actions without the Kleene star ∗; anticipating the syntax and semantics that we present later in this paper, consider
e.g., F(α∗) = [α∗]F(α), where all the discussion above holds for α being the abstraction of any complex action.
The theory that we develop for CL, i.e., the semantics and various proofs, is already quite involved without using the ∗
inside the deonticmodalities. Ifwewere to add theKleene ∗ to capture some esoteric examples that onemight find appealing
the complexity that this would trigger in terms of theory and proofs does not justify its effort.
(3) CL defines an action complement operation which encodes the violation of an obligation. Obligations (and prohibi-
tions) can be violated by not doing the obligatory action (respectively doing the forbidden action). The action complement
that we have is different from the various notions of action negation found in the literature on PDL or DDL-like logics
[5,20,24,26]. In [26], as in [20], action negation is with respect to the universal relation which for PDL gives undecidability.
Decidability of PDL with negation of only atomic actions has been achieved in [24]. A so called “relativized action comple-
ment” is defined in [5] which is the complement of an action (not w.r.t. the universal relation but) w.r.t. a set of atomic
actions closed under the application of some action operators. This kind of negation still gives undecidability when several
action operators are involved.
In CL the action complement is a derived operator defined as a function which takes a compound action and returns
another compound action, i.e., it is not a principal combinator like+, ·, or×. Intuitively the complement comprises of all the
immediate actions that take us outside the tree of the complemented action [6].
(4) One difference from the standard PDL is that we consider deterministic actions. This is natural and desired in legal
contracts as opposed to the programming languages community where nondeterminism is an important notion. In pro-
gramming languages a nondeterministic action can be “sendmessage through the network”whichmay have two outcomes:
wither the message is received, or the message is not received, as lost by the network. In contrast, a deterministic action (as
in e.g., deterministic automata) has a single outcome. In legal contracts the outcome of an action like “deposit 100$ in the
bank account” is uniquely determined. In CLwe take inspiration from the deterministic PDL which has been investigated in
[2]. Deterministic PDL is undecidable if action negation (or intersection of actions) is added [20].
(5) We add a concurrency operator×to model that two actions are done at the same time. The model of concurrency
that we adopt is the synchrony model of Milner’s SCCS [28]. Synchrony is a natural choice when reasoning about the notion
“at the same time” for human-like actions as we have in legal contracts (opposed to the instructions in a programming
language). Moreover, from an algebraic point of view, synchrony is easy to integrate with the other regular operations on
actions (the choice and the sequence).
The notion of synchrony has different meanings in different areas of computer science. Here we take the distinction
between synchrony and asynchrony as presented in the SCCS calculus and later implemented in, e.g., the Esterel synchronous
programming language [3]. We understand asynchrony as when two concurrent systems proceed at indeterminate relative
speeds (i.e., their actions may have different non-correlated durations); whereas in the synchrony model each of the two
concurrent systems instantaneously perform a single action at each time instant. This is an abstract view of the actions
found in contracts which is good for reasoning about quite a big range of properties for contracts, like properties that do
not take into consideration the structure or types of the actions. Such properties would look only at the interplay of actions,
temporal ordering, choice, or existence of actions. If one needs actions which have durations (e.g., “work 3 h”) or which are
parameterized by amounts (e.g., “deposit 100$”) then CL has to be extended accordingly.
The synchrony model of concurrency takes the assumption that time is discrete and that basic actions are instantaneous
and represent the time step. Moreover, at each time step all possible actions are performed, i.e., the system is considered
eager and active. For this reason, if at a time point there is enabled an obligation to do an action, then this action must be
immediately executed so that the obligation is not violated. Synchrony assumes a global clockwhich provides the time for all
the actors (participants, parallel components) in the system. Note that for practical implementation purposes this is a rather
strong assumption which offends the popular view from process algebras [21,29]. On the other hand the mathematical
framework of the synchrony model is much cleaner and more general than the asynchronous interleaving model (SCCS has
the (asynchronous) CCS as a subcalculus [28]). The synchronous composition operator× is different from the classical ‖ of
CCS.
The synchrony model is better suited for reasoning about concurrent actions than for implementing concurrency as is
the more low-level asynchrony model. Because of the assumption of an eager behavior for the actions the scope of the
obligations (and of the other deontic modalities too) is immediate, making them transient obligations which are enforced
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only in the current point in time. One can get persistent obligations by using temporal operators, like the always operator.
The eagerness assumption facilitates both reasoning about existence of the deontic modalities and about violations of the
obligations or prohibitions.
Regarding the dynamic logic part, CL introduces the synchrony operation×on the actions inside the dynamic modality.
Therefore, CL can use dynamic logic reasoning about synchronous actions and, from this point of view, it is included in the
class of extensions of PDL that can reason about concurrent actions: PDL∩ with intersection of actions [18] which is undecid-
able for deterministic structures or concurrent PDL [31,32] which adopts ideas from alternating automata [11]. Contrasting
with the discouraging undecidability results from above, CL (with action complement and synchronous composition over
deterministic actions inside the dynamic modality) is decidable. This makes CLmore attractive for automation of reasoning
about contracts.
(6) CL defines a conflict relation #C over actions which represents the fact that two actions cannot be done at the same
time. This is necessary for detecting (and for ruling out) a first kind of conflicts in contracts: “Obligatory to go west and
obligatory to go east” should result in a conflict because the actions “go west” and “go east” cannot be done at the same time
(i.e., are conflicting). The second kind of conflicts that CL rules out are: “Obligatory to go west and forbidden to go west”
which is a standard requirement on a deontic logic.
(7) In CL conditional obligations (or prohibitions) can be of two kinds.
a. The first kind is given with the propositional implication: C1 → OC(α) which is read as “if C1 is the case then action
α is obligatory” (e.g., “If Internet traffic is high then the Client is obliged to pay”).
b. The second kind is given with the dynamic box modality: [β]OC(α)which is read as “if action β was performed then
action α becomes obligatory” (e.g., “After receiving necessary data, the Provider is obliged to offer password”).
(8) Regarding the deontic modalities, CL includes directly in the definition of the obligation and prohibition the repa-
rations in case of violations. The deontic modalities are OC and FC where C is a contract clause representing the reparation.
Thismodels the notions of contrary-to-duty obligations (CTDs) and contrary-to-prohibitions (CTPs) as found in deontic logic
applied over actions like DDL [26,51]. These notions are in contrast with the classical notion of CTD as found in the SDL
literature [9,33]. In SDL, what we call reparations are secondary obligations which hold in the same world as the primary
obligation. In our setting, where the action changes the context (the world), one can see a violation of an obligation (or
prohibition) only after the action is performed and thus the reparations are enforced in the next world (in the changed
context).
The approach of CL to contrary-to-duty rules out many of the problems faced by SDL (like the gentle murderer paradox).
On the other hand it does not capture the wording of the SDL examples. In the end of Section 4.1 we present the stand of CL
w.r.t. some of the most important paradoxes of SDL.
(9) Standard deontic logic SDL, and other variants of it, consider one of the three deonticmodalities as primitive (usually
O or P) and the other two modalities are defined in terms of this primitive one using the propositional operators. To the
contrary, the deontic modalities are not interdefinable in CL. Only some of the implications that SDL makes hold in CL, and
we discuss these in Section 3.2.
(10) The semantics of CL is given in terms of normative structures and it is specially defined to capture several natural
properties which are found in legal contracts. These are motivated (with examples) in Section 4.
A work, close in many respects with our work here, was recently presented in DEON [46] and is, like us, essentially
inspired by [10,43]. Their work is particularly appealing because of the neat algebraic presentation. Moreover, [46] carefully
investigates the different axiomatizations of permissions and prohibitions, where small differences in the intuitive under-
standing of their relations are being explicitly formalized by the set of characterizing axioms. Nevertheless, they base their
nice presentation on a simpler set of actions, which are characterized by the nicely behaved Boolean algebra. Because of
this they do not investigate sequences of actions, and also do not have an easy transition to the dynamic actions (i.e., the
regular synchronous actions including the Kleene ∗, as we do with the synchronous Kleene algebra formalization). Another
differencewith CL is that [46] defines obligation in terms of permission,which is not the case in CL. At the semantic level, the
same notion of markers as we have in normative structures are used in [46] only that they have a more algebraic view of the
sets of markers related to the interpretation of the actions in the spirit of Boolean algebra, as opposed to our interpretation
in the spirit of Kleene algebra.
2. Synchronous actions
In this section we present the formalism of the synchronous actions that are the basis of the CL logic. We provide here
important results about synchronous actions needed in later sectionswhen giving the semantics of CL.We introduce actions
gradually, first defining deontic actions which will be the actions used inside the deontic modalities. These actions are then
enriched with tests and the Kleene ∗ operator, becoming, what we call, dynamic actions because these will be used inside
the dynamic box modality of CL. All these actions are called synchronous because all include the synchrony operator that
we mentioned in the introduction.
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Definition 2.1 (Deontic actions). Consider a finite set of basic (or atomic) actions AB (denoted by a, b, c, . . . ). The special
actions 0, 1 ∈ AB are called respectively the violating and the skip actions. The action combinators are: “+” for choice of two
actions, “·” for sequence of two actions (or concatenation), and “×” for concurrent composition (synchronously) of two actions.
We generally call compound actions (or just actions) terms ofAD (denotedα, β, γ, . . ., possibly primed, double-primed, etc.)
obtained from basic actions, 0, and 1 using the action combinators. We call×-actions, denoted α×, β×, γ× (possibly primed,
etc.) the subset of actionsA×B ⊂ AD generated fromAB using only the×constructor. The actions defined herewill be referred
to as deontic actions and can be seen as generated by the grammar below:
α
= a | 0 | 1 | α×α | α · α | α + α (deontic actions).
To avoid unnecessary parentheses we use the following precedence over the combinators:+ < · <×. Table 1 axiomatizes
the equality between actions.
Actions as presented here are related to the more general algebraic structure called synchronous Kleene algebra in [37].
Note that 0, 1 ∈ A×B and the inclusion of sortsAB ⊆ A×B ⊂ AD . Also note thatA×B is finite up to the application of the axioms,
because AB is finite and×is idempotent over basic actions; see axiom (14). Because of the idempotence we take the liberty
of using⊆ to compare elements of A×B, as α× can be seen as the set of basic actions that compose it (e.g., a×b ⊆ a×b×c or
a ⊆ b×c). We will say that β is bigger than α whenever α ⊆ β . So, in the example above a×b×c is bigger than a×b.
In the rest of the paper we consider the set A×B up to the application of the axioms of Table 1. Particularly, only axioms
(10), (11), and (14) are applicable to×-actions (i.e., when we talk about×-actions we talk about the representative of an
equivalence class of×-actions w.r.t. axioms (10), (11), and (14)). This representative is the minimal one, like a×b instead of
a×b×b or a×b×b×b. This is also why the A×B is finite.
With CL we are reasoning about the structure of the complex actions, where the particular atomic actions of AB are
abstracted away to being just some symbols; these can be made concrete by the user, as for example in programming
languages where each assignment that the program makes is one atomic action. In legal contracts an atomic action can be,
e.g., “Client pays 100$”.
Intuitively, we consider that the actions are performed by somebody (being that a person, a program, or an e-agent). We
talk about “performing actions” and one should not think of processes “executing” actions and operational semantics like in
SCCS; we do not discuss operational semantics nor bisimulation equivalences in this paper.
Definition 2.2 (Conflict relation). Consider a symmetric and irreflexive relation over basic actions AB called conflict relation
and denoted by #C ⊆ AB × AB.
The conflict relation is a notion often found in legal contracts and is given a priori. The intuition is that if two actions are
in conflict then the actions cannot be done at the same time. This intuition explains the need for the following equational
implication:
(18) a#C b → a×b = 0 ∀a, b ∈ AB.
There is no transitivity of #C which is natural as also shown by the following example: action “drive” may be in conflict
with both “drink” and “talk at the phone” but still one can, legally, “drink and talk at the phone” at the same time, though
not possible physically.
From an algebraic point of view, the purpose of the #C relation is to addmore structure on the algebra that was not there
before (only from the properties of the operators). This extra structure comes from outside, from some properties given
by an oracle (by the user) on the generators of the algebra (i.e., on the basic actions). By more structure is meant that new
equalities hold depending on the information given through #C . The purpose of #C is different than what is sometimes
done in algebra: e.g., on an idempotent semiring one defines a relation α ≤ β iff α + β = β in terms of some special
Table 1
Axioms of action equality.
(1) α + (β+γ )=(α+β)+γ
(2) α + β = β + α
(3) α + 0 = 0 + α = α
(4) α + α = α
(5) α · (β · γ ) = (α · β) · γ
(6) α · 1 = 1 · α = α
(7) α · 0 = 0 · α = 0
(8) α · (β+γ )=α · β + α · γ
(9) (α+β)· γ = α · γ +β · γ
(10) α×(β×γ ) = (α×β)×γ
(11) α×β = β×α
(12) α×1 = 1×α = α
(13) α×0 = 0×α = 0
(14) a×a = a ∀a ∈ AB
(15) α×(β + γ ) = α×β + α×γ
(16) (α + β)×γ = α×γ + β×γ
(17) (α× · α)×(β× · β) = (α××β×)·(α×β), ∀α×, β× ∈ A×B
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structure on the algebra, and studies this structure by studying this relation instead (e.g., ≤ is reflexive, which means that
the properties of the+ operator are such that α + α = α, i.e., idempotence). In the case of #C we do not define it in terms
of some existing structure (and properties) in the algebra (i.e., in terms of some equalities like a×b = 0), but we use #C to
impose some more structure on the algebra. Therefore we added the equational implication (18).
Definition 2.3 (Canonical form). We say that an action α is in canonical form, denoted by α, iff it is 0, 1, or has the following
form:
α
= +i∈I (αi× · αi)
where
a. αi× = αj×, for all i, j ∈ I;
b. for all i ∈ I, either
(a) αi× ∈ A×B and αi ∈ AD \ {0, 1} is an action in canonical form, or
(b) αi× ∈ A×B ∪ {1} and αi is absent (i.e., when no more · applications exist).
Note that αi× does not contain twice the same action a, for any a ∈ AB and i ∈ I, as it is part of A×B, thus, a×a is not
in canonical form, but a and a×b are. The indexing set I is finite as A×B is finite and αi× are different. The purpose of the
constraints in Definition 2.3.2 is to not allow 1 to appear in the canonical forms, except for some very special cases: either
the whole action α = 1; or 1 appears in a summation with other actions as summands. All other possible appearances of 1
are disallowed by this constraint 2.3.2. Particularly, 2.3.2a does not allow an αi alone to be 1 and 2.3.2b says that a αi× ∈ A×B
is allowed to take the value 1 (which was not the case before, as being defined from A×B) only in the case when it is not
followed by any other action.
Example 2.1. Consider the complex action α = (a + b) · (c + d) which is not in canonical form but is equivalent to the
canonical form α = a · (c + d) + b · (c + d) (obtained by applying axiom (9)). On the other hand α is equivalent also to
a · c + a · d + b · c + b · d (obtained by applying axioms (9) then (8)) which is not in canonical form because the constraint
1 in Definition 2.3 is not met as a appears twice as first element in the summation.
Related to the constraints in Definition 2.3.2 the action 1 · a is not in canonical form because of 2.3.2b (and neither is
b+ 1 · a), and action a · 1 is not in canonical form because of 2.3.2a (and neither is b+ a · 1), but action a+ 1 is in canonical
formbecause there is nothing following the branch represented by 1 and therefore the constraint of 2.3.2b allows this branch
to be 1. From the same reasons the action a · (1 + b) is also in canonical form. 
Theorem 2.4 [37, Theorem 2.8]. For any α there exists α in canonical form s.t. α = α.
The proof in [37, Theorem 2.8] actually shows how to construct the canonical form of a given action in an algorithmic
fashion.
In rewriting theory, to apply an axiom means to apply the rule obtained from directing the axiom, in our case we direct
the axioms from left to right; see [1] for details on rewriting theory.
Theorem 2.5. For a canonical form α = +i∈I αi× · αi only axiom (8) can be applied (and none other of the axioms of Table 1),
modulo associativity and commutativity.
Proof. Note first that we work modulo associativity and commutativity of+ and×, and modulo associativity for · (thus we
do not consider axioms (1), (2), (5), (10), (11)). The remaining axioms of Table 1 are considered directed from left to right.
In the rest of the proof we argue only for the first level of the canonical form because the definition is recursive. The same
arguments, applied in an inductive manner, hold for the smaller subactions αi in canonical form.
Axiom (3) is not applicable because αi× cannot be 0 and neither can αi because of Definition 2.3-2.(a). Axiom (4) is dealt
with by the condition in Definition 2.3-1. The left part of axiom (6) cannot be applied because of the constraint in Definition
2.3-2.(a) which makes αi = 1. The right part of (6) is not applicable because αi× = 1 when αi exists. Similar arguments
using the c.(a) constraint again show that axiom (7) is not applicable. Clearly, axiom (9) is not applicable to a canonical form.
Axioms (12) and (13) are dealt with by the fact that αi× are from A×B (contain only basic actions). Axiom (14) is taken care of
by the same argument. The main purpose of the canonical form is to make sure that the axioms for×(like (15), (16), (17))
are applied exhaustively to the original action, and cannot be applied any more to the canonical form. In other words the
axioms (15), (16), (17) push the×inside the action until it reaches the basic actions. 
The following corollary is immediate from the proof of Theorem 2.5 (applying axiom (8) to a canonical form breaks the
canonicity).
Corollary 2.6. The canonical form of an action α is unique (modulo associativity and commutativity).
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For the deontic modalities, one important notion is action complement. In our view action complement encodes the
violation of an obligation (as we see later in Section 3). Intuitively, we say that the complement α of action α is the action
given by all the immediate actions which take us outside the tree of α. This viewwas aired in [6] but no formal definitionwas
given. In our case we need to deal with synchronous actions too. The notion of action complement that we give shares ideas
with [26] but it is not restricted to respect all the axioms of [26]; we want action complement to capture naturally what it
means to violate an obligation in an eager system (where no idling is possible). With α it is easy to formally define α.
Definition 2.7 (Action complement). The action complement is denoted by α and is defined as a function : AD → AD (i.e.,
action complement is not a principal combinator for the actions) and works on the equivalent canonical form α as:
α = +
i∈I










= {αi×| i ∈ I}. The set R contains all the×-actions β×with the property that none of the actions αi× are included
in β×:
R
= {β× | β× ∈ A×B and ∀i ∈ I, αi× ⊆ β×};
and γ
j
× ∈ A×B and ∃αi× ∈ R s.t. αi× ⊆ γ j×. The indexing set I′j ⊆ I is defined for each j ∈ J as:
I′j
= {i ∈ I | αi× ⊆ γ j×}.
Complement of 1 is 0 = 1 and complement of 0 is 1 = 0.
The complement operation formalizes the fact that an action is not performed. In an eager system not performing an
actionmeans that some other action is performed (because the system is not allowed to idle). For a complex action this boils
down to either not performing any of its immediate actions αi×, or by performing one of the immediate actions and then not
performing the remaining action. Note that to perform an action αi×means to perform any action that includes αi×. Therefore
in the complement we may have actions γ
j
×which include more immediate actions.
Example 2.2. Consider the complex action α = a · b + c · d, with AB = {a, b, c, d}, and assume to perform γ j× = a×c. At
this point we need to look at both actions b and d in order to derive the complement, e.g., performing now d means that α
was done, whereas performing c means that α was not done (and a×c · c must be part of complement). 
Our intention is to define theminimal action that describes the complement of someα;with the idea that the complement
is an action that immediately takes us outside the tree of α. By minimal we refer to the number of single-step actions (or,
as we define later, the length of the complement should be minimal; i.e., the length of its sequences). As soon as an action
steps outside the tree of α there is no point in describing the rest of the actions that may follow, because no matter which
these are the α still remains not done. In this way, as shown in Proposition 2.8, the action complement does not have infinite
sequences of actions, and at the same time, this complement is enough to describe what it means to violate an obligation
and, hence, enables us to determine where the reparations should be placed (see related details later in the semantics of the
deontic modalities).
Example 2.3. We give some simple and illustrative examples for action complement. Consider AB = {a, b}, then: a = b;
a · b = b + a · a; b + a · b = a · a; 1 + a = 0. 
The following result states that our notion of action complement always produces an action in canonical form.
Proposition 2.8. The complement operation returns a (finitely described) deontic action which is in canonical form.
Proof. For the first part of the proposition we prove that α has no infinite application of the + constructor (we say “no
infinite branching”) and also no infinite application of the · constructor (we say “no infinite depth”). In both cases we use
induction on the structure of the action complement. The basis of the induction is clearly satisfied as 0, 1, and all a ∈ AB
have both finite branching and finite depth.
R is finite because R ⊆ A×B, whereA×B is finite, and thus+β×∈R β× is finitely branching. The indexing set J is finite (having
maximum size |A×B|) thus+j∈J γ j× is finitely branching. Lastly, the indexing sets I′j are finite subsets of the I, hence+i∈I′j αi is
a subaction of α. Thus we apply the induction hypothesis to it and deduce that its complement+i∈I′j αi is finitely branching,
for any I′j ⊆ I. We conclude that α = +β×∈R β× + +j∈J γ j× · +i∈I′j αi is finitely branching.
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It remains to prove that α has no infinite depth. The first part of the action complement (i.e., +β×∈R β×) introduces only
branches of finite depth 1. For the second part (i.e., +j∈J γ j× · +i∈I′j αi) we can apply the induction hypothesis to +i∈I′j αi
because, as we discussed before, this is a subaction of α. Thus, we have that each +i∈I′j αi has finite depth. These are
concatenated to the γ
j
× actions which have depth 1, thus, making all the second choice of finite depth, and hence the α has
finite depth.
For the second part of the proposition it is easy to see that the action complement respects the canonical form. Action
complement is a choice of sequences, each sequence being either a single×-action (i.e., from +β×∈R β×) or an×-action γ j×
followed by another action+i∈I′j αi which we know by induction that is in canonical form. 
An important result from [37] that we need later is the interpretation of the deontic actions as rooted trees.
Definition 2.9 (Rooted tree). A rooted tree with labeled edges is an acyclic connected graph (N , E,AB)with a designated node
r called root node. N is the set of nodes and E is the set of labeled edges between nodes (in graphical notation n α−→ m).
The labels α ∈ 2AB are sets of basic labels. Labels are compared for set equality (or set inclusion). Note the special empty set
label. We consider a special label Λ to stand for an impossible label. We restrict our presentation to finite rooted trees (i.e.,
there is no infinite path in the graph starting from the root node). The set of all such defined trees is denoted T .
Notation: When the label of an edge is not important (i.e. it can be any label) we may use the notation n −→ m instead
of n
α−→ m ∀α ∈ 2AB . Each node in {m | n −→ m} is called a child node of n. We denote by |n| the depth of the node n in
the tree; which is the number of edges needed to reach n from the root. A path of a tree is denoted σ ∈ T . A path which
cannot be extended with a new edge is called final. The final nodes on each final path are called leaf nodes; denoted by
leafs(T) = {n | n is a leaf node}. The height of a tree, denoted h(T), is the maximum of |n| for all the leaf nodes n. We write
T1
.= T2 when two trees are equal modulo renaming of the nodes (i.e. isomorphic).
Theorem 2.10 (Interpretation of deontic actions [37]). For any action α there exists a tree representation corresponding to the
canonical form α.
Proof. The representation is an interpretation function T : AD → T which interprets all actions as trees. More precisely,
given an arbitrary action of AD , the canonical form is computed first and then T generates the tree representation of the
canonical form. Because the canonical form of an action is unique, cf. Corollary 2.6, the tree representation is indeed a
function. We do not give an algorithm for computing the canonical form as one may simply apply exhaustively all the
axioms excluding (8).
The function T is defined inductively, on canonical forms only. The basis of the induction is to interpret 0, 1, and each
×-action of A×B as a tree with edges labeled from 2AB , as pictured in Fig. 1. Recall that actions ofA×B ∪ {0, 1} are in canonical
form. For a general action in canonical form α = +i∈I αi×·αi the tree is generated by adding one branch to the root node for
each element αi×of the top summation operation. The label of the branch is the set {αi×} corresponding to the×-action. The
construction continues inductively by attaching at the end of each newly added branch the tree interpretation of the smaller
action αi. Intuitively,+ provides the branching in the tree, and · provides the parent-child relation on each branch. 
Example 2.4. Consider the interpretation of the action p · b + (d×n) · p · p as the tree pictured in Fig. 2. 
We now extend our grammar of actions with new constructs, namely the Kleene star and tests.
Definition 2.11 (Dynamic synchronous actions). The dynamic actions add to the deontic actions the Kleene star ∗ operator
and a set of Boolean tests denoted A?. The elements of the set A? are called tests (or guards) and are included in the set of
Fig. 1. Trees corresponding to 0, 1, a ∈ AB , and a×b ∈ A×B .
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Fig. 2. Tree interpretation for p · b + (d×n) · p · p.
actions (i.e., tests are special actions). Tests are generated from a finite set A?B of basic tests. We denote tests by ϕ (possibly
indexed) and basic tests by φ. The dynamic actions are constructed with the grammar below:
δ
= a | ϕ? | δ + δ | δ · δ | δ×δ | δ∗ (dynamic actions)
ϕ
= φ | 0 | 1 | ϕ + ϕ | ϕ · ϕ | ϕ×ϕ | ¬ϕ (tests).
Note the overloading of the operators+, ·,×, and constants 0, 1: over arbitrary actions they have the meaning as before,
whereas, over tests they take the meaning of the well known disjunction (for+), conjunction (for · and×), falsity and truth
(for0 and1). The behavior over tests is givenby the axioms that are required,which are those of Boolean algebra. In particular,
· and×respect different axioms when applied to normal actions, though in the case of tests they turn out to have the same
behavior, acting both as a Boolean conjunction. This is clear for×, and probably less intuitive for ·. The reason for the latter
behaving as a conjunction is that checking two simple tests in sequence is independent on which one is tested first, so the
result is the same as checking their conjunction (see details in [37]).
In [37] it was shown how it can be associated to any dynamic synchronous action an automaton on guarded synchronous
strings; this is similar to the interpretation as trees that we gave for deontic actions. The completeness result of [37] ensures
that workingwith the dynamic synchronous actions or with the automata on guarded synchronous strings is the same (they
are interchangeable). This result can be instantiated to deontic actions to ensure that working with the deontic actions or
with their tree representations is the same.
Definition 2.12 (Guarded synchronous strings). Over the set of basic tests A?B we define atoms as functions ν : A?B → {0, 1}
assigning a Boolean value to each basic test. Consider the finite alphabet  = 2AB \ {∅} of all nonempty subsets of basic
actions (denoted x, y). A guarded synchronous string (denoted by u, v,w) is a sequence
w = ν0x1ν1 . . . xnνn, n ≥ 0,
where νi are atoms. We define first(w) = ν0 and last(w) = νn. Denote by Atoms = {0, 1}A?B the set of all atoms ν . We call
a synchronous string a guarded synchronous string stripped of all the atoms νi (i.e., the synchronous string associated with
the w above is just x1 . . . xn).
Proposition 2.13 (Automata for guards [37]). An automaton A = (S, , S0, ρ, F) consists of a finite set of states S together with
a transition relation ρ between these states which is labeled by letters from the alphabet . An automaton accepts sets of strings
(also called the language of words accepted by the automaton) where each accepting string is the sequence of labels coming from
a sequence of transitions where the first transition starts in an initial state from S0 and the last one ends in a final state from F.
For the set of Atoms there exists a class of finite state automata which accept all and only the subsets of atoms. We denote the
set of all such automata byM and one automaton by M ∈ M.
We can now give the representation of the dynamic synchronous actions as the two-level hierarchical automata defined
below.
Definition 2.14 (Automata on guarded synchronous strings). Consider a two level finite automaton AG = (S, , S0, ρ, F, ·).
It consists at the first level of a finite automaton on synchronous strings (S, , S0, ρ, F), together with a map · : S → M.
An automaton on synchronous strings consists of a finite set of states S, the finite alphabet  = 2AB \ {∅}, a set of initial
designated states S0 ⊆ S, a transition relation ρ :  → S × S, and a set of final states F . The mapping · associates with
each state on the first level an automatonM ∈ M as defined in Proposition 2.13 which accepts atoms. The automata in the
states make the second (lower) level. Denote the language of atoms accepted by swith L(s).
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Fig. 3. Automaton on guarded synchronous strings for (p · b)∗ + (d×n) · ϕ? · p · p. The picture omits L(ti) = M(Atoms) when i ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
Theorem 2.15 (Interpretation of dynamic actions [37]). For any dynamic action δ there is a corresponding automaton AG(δ)
which accepts the same set of guarded synchronous strings that δ describes.
Example 2.5. Let us consider the automaton AG(δ) for the dynamic synchronous action δ = (p · b)∗ + (d×n) · ϕ? · p · p,
depicted in Fig. 3. The AG(δ) automaton has in state t1 (on the second level) an automaton M(ϕ) corresponding to the test
ϕ which accepts all and only the atoms that constitute a satisfying interpretation for ϕ. In all the other states of AG(δ) we
have the trivial automaton for that accepts any atom. 
3. Deontic modalities over synchronous actions
In this section we introduce the deontic part of the CL logic and we work only with deontic modalities over synchronous
actions (and the underlying propositional language).
Definition 3.1. The deontic expressions of the CL logic are constructed by the grammar below:
C := φ | OC(α) | P(α) | FC(α) | C → C | ⊥ (deontic formulas)
α := a | 0 | 1 | α×α | α · α | α + α (deontic actions).
We call an expression C a (general) contract clause. A contract clause is built using the classical propositional implication
operator →, where the other operators ∧,∨,¬,↔,,⊕ (exclusive or) are expressed in terms of → and ⊥ as in propo-
sitional logic. The building blocks of a contract clause are the propositional constants φ drawn from a finite set B and the
deontic modalities OC(α), P(α), and FC(α). 2 These represent respectively the obligation, permission, and prohibition of
performing a given action α. Intuitively OC(α) states the obligation to perform α, and the reparation C in case the obligation
is violated, i.e., whenever α is not performed. The reparation may be any contract clause. The modality OC(α) (resp. FC(α))
represents what is called CTD (resp. CTP) in dynamic deontic logic. Obligations without reparations are written as O⊥(α)
where ⊥ (and conversely ) is the Boolean false (respectively true). We usually write O(α) instead of O⊥(α). Obligations
with no reparation are sometimes in the literature called categorical because they must not be violated (i.e., there is no
reparation for their violation, thus a violation would give violation of the whole contract). The prohibition modality FC(α)
states that the actionα is forbidden and in case the prohibition is violated the reparation C is enforced. Note that it is possible
to express nested CTDs and CTPs. Permissions have no reparations associated because they cannot be violated; permissions
can only be exercised. The logical expressions of CL are interpreted over Kripke-like structures which we call normative
structures.
Definition 3.2 (Normative structure). A normative structure is KN=(W, R2AB , V, ) where:• W is a set of worlds (also called states);
• 2AB contains the labels of the structure as sets of basic actions from the finite setAB. R2AB : 2AB → 2W×W returns for
each label a partial function on the set of worlds (written as a relation);
• V : B → 2W is a valuation function of the propositional constants returning a set of worlds where the constant
holds;
•  : W → 2 is a marking function which marks each world with markers from = {◦a, •a | a ∈ AB}. The marking
function respects the restriction that no world can be marked by both ◦a and •a, for any a ∈ AB.
A pointed normative structure is a normative structure with a designated world i (denoted by 〈KN , i〉).
2 For this article,where the examples of CL formulas are not big, the notationOC and FC is pleasing and intuitive; but in the bigger examples thesemaybe clutter-
ing andundesired. In such a case ausermay choose adifferent notation, likeO(α)C, and an example likeOFC1 (β)∧C2 (α)would looknicer asO(α)((F(β)C1)∧C2).
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Fig. 4. Example of a normative structure.
We denote by an indexed t a node of a tree (or by r the root) and by an indexed s (or i for initial) a state of a normative
structure. We use the graphical notation s
α−→ s′ for the transitions of the normative structures too. We sometimes abuse
the notation by writing s ∈ KN for s ∈ W of KN , and s α−→ s′ ∈ KN for s α−→ s′ ∈ R2AB of KN . Note that we consider both
the tree from before and the normative structures to have the same set of basic labels AB.
KN is deterministic as for each label from one world there is at most one successor world; i.e., the partial function
requirement. We use deterministic structures because in the deontic realm, as in legal contracts, each action (like “deposit
100$ in bank account”) must have a well determined behavior (i.e., the actions do not have a nondeterministic outcome).
The deterministic restriction of Kripke structures was investigated in [2]. The marking function and the markers are needed
to identify obligatory (i.e., ◦) and prohibited (i.e., •) actions. Markers with different purposes were used in [26] to identify
violations of obligations, in [47] to mark permitted transitions, and in [10] to identify permitted events.
As an example let us consider the normative structure in Fig. 4, which has five states and two constant propositions
B = {φ, φ′}. The valuation function assigns to each proposition a set of states, e.g., V(φ) = {s1, s3, s5}.
A first difference between normative structures and the standard Kripke structures is that the labels in normative struc-
tures can be sets; in Fig. 4 there is one transition labeled by {d, n} (i.e., R2AB ({d, n}) = {(s1, s2)}) and two transitions labeled{p} (i.e., R2AB ({p}) = {(s2, s3), (s3, s4)}). The second difference is that normative structures have a marking function, and
in our example it marks s2 by {◦n, ◦d}, s5 by {•b}, and s3, s4 by {◦p} each.
A normative structure has essentially two components: the labeled transitions (related to the actions that can be per-
formed from each state) and the marking function (related to obligations and prohibitions). Without the marking function
we are in the known setting of Kripke structures where an action logic like the propositional dynamic logic PDL is what we
need to talk about the labeled transitions, i.e., about the actions and their regular structure. This is enough to talk about
programs and their execution, nondeterminism, or loops.
In order to talk about which actions are obligatory and which are forbidden we introduce the marking function. This
decorates the states of the Kripke structure with markers, giving rise to what we called normative structure. 3 If one needs
to talk only about executions of actions, then the markers are superfluous. But if one needs to talk about which executions
are respecting and which are violating some obligation of a complex action, then the markers come into play. In fact, the
purpose of normative structures is to give a representation to a contract (i.e., to obligations and prohibitions), and this is
what we investigate in this paper. Talking about which traces of actions respect or violate a contract was done in [23] and
that work should have formal connections with the present, but these are still work in progress. (See [36, Section 4.4.1] for
preliminary results in this direction.)
Remarks. The markers of  can be seen as special propositional constants, i.e.,  ⊂ B, and the marking function as part
of the valuation function. Our choice is to separate these, as the markers have different purpose from the propositional
constants and the valuation. The purpose of the valuation is to represent the outcome of the actions, whereas the purpose
of the markers is to represent the deontic content of the actions (i.e., which actions are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden).
Moreover, the presentation of the semantics of CL is more clean.
In order to relate the semantic domain of our language with the underlying algebra of actions on which the deontic
modalities operate on, we will give a formal relationship between normative structures and trees through a notion of
simulation.
Definition 3.3 (Simulation). For a tree T = (N , E,AB) and a normative structure KN = (W, R2AB , V, )wedefine a relation
S ⊆ N ×W which we call the simulation of the tree node by the state of the structure:
t S s iff ∀t γ−→ t′ ∈T , ∃s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈KN s.t. γ ⊆γ ′ ∧ t′Ss′, and
∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈KN with γ ⊆γ ′ implies t′ S s′.
We say that a tree T , with root r is simulated by a normative structure KN w.r.t. a state s, denoted T Ss KN , if and only if r S s.
3 To be precise, a normative structure is also deterministic, whereas a general Kripke structure may not.
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Note two differences with the classical definition of simulation: first, the labels of the normative structure may be bigger
(a superset) than the labels in the tree. This can be intuitively motivated by the idea that respecting an obligatory action
means executing an action which includes it (is bigger). We can drop this condition and consider only γ = γ ′, in which
case we call the relation strong simulation and denote by Ss . The second difference is that any transition in the normative
structure that can simulate an edge in the tree must enter under the simulation relation. This is because from the state s′
onwards we need to be able to continue to look in the structure for the remaining tree (to see that it is simulated). Trivially,
any strong simulation relation is also a simulation relation. We can weaken the definition of simulation by combining the
two conditions into:∀t γ−→ t′ ∈ T ,∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KN withγ ⊆ γ ′ then t′ S˜ s′.We call the resulting relation partial simulation
and denote it by S˜ .
Example 3.1. Consider the tree from Fig. 2 and denote it by T(α)where α = p · b+ (d×n) · p · p. This tree is simulated by
the normative structure KN of Fig. 4 w.r.t. the state s1. It is easy to check that r S s1: for the edge r
{p}−→ t4 we find in KN the
transition s1
{p,b}−→ s4 that respects the inclusion of labels. We also have that t4 S s4 since for the only edge t4 {b}−→ t5 there
is the transition s4
{b}−→ s1 in KN simulating it (the second constraint from the definition of simulation is satisfied trivially
for t4
{b}−→ t5 because there is no other transition from s4 in KN ). Moreover, for the edge r {p}−→ t4 the second condition
for simulation is satisfied because there is no other transition from s1 with a label that includes {p}. For the second edge
r
{d,n}−→ t1 we find the transition s1 {d,n}−→ s2 in KN that respects all the simulation conditions (checking these is done as
before). If we were to change the label of the transition (s1, s4) to {p} then the tree would still be simulated but it would
also be strongly simulated.
Consider a simpler example of a tree T(b) interpreting the basic action b. This too is strongly simulated by the structure
KN w.r.t. s1 because, for the only edge of the tree labeled with {b} we find the transition s1 {b}−→ s5 which has exactly the
same label, and the leaf node of the tree is trivially simulated by s5 because there are no edges out of it (note that this holds
for any leaf node of a tree). On top, the second simulation condition also holds because the only other transition that has a
label that includes b is s1
{p,b}−→ s4 and for this transition s4 trivially simulates the leaf node. 
Given a tree that is simulated by a normative structure, we can isolate amaximal substructure of the latter that simulates
the given tree. As we will see later, it is also useful to identify what parts of the normative structure do not simulate the
tree, giving place to what we call the non-simulating remainder of the structure. These notions are formally defined in
Definitions 3.4 and 3.5.
Definition 3.4 (Maximal simulating structure). For a tree T that is simulated by a normative structure KN w.r.t. the state i (in
notation T S i KN ), we denote by KT,imax = (W ′, R′2AB, V ′, ′) and call the maximal simulating structure w.r.t. T and i of KN the
maximal sub-structure of KN respecting the following, where KN = (W, R2AB , V, ):
a. i ∈ W ′, V ′ = V|W ′ and ′ = |W ′
b. ∀t γ−→ t′ ∈ T then ∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KN s.t. t S s ∧ γ ⊆ γ ′ ∧ t′ S s′
s′ ∈ W ′ and s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ R′
2AB .
4
Definition 3.5 (Non-simulating remainder). We call the non-simulating remainder of KN w.r.t. T and i the sub-structure
KT,irem = (W ′′, R′′2AB , V ′′, ′′) of KN that is maximal and respects the following:
a. s
γ−→ s′′ ∈ R′′
2AB iff s
γ−→ s′′ ∈ KT,imax ∧ s ∈ KT,imax ∧ ∃s
γ ′−→ s′ ∈ KT,imax ,
b. s ∈ W ′′ iff s is part of a transition in R′′
2AB ,
c. V ′′ = V|W ′′ , and ′′ = |W ′′ .
For the two formal definitions above consider the following example.
Example 3.2. Take the simple action bwith the trivial tree T(b)which has only one edge r
{b}−→ t1.We have discussed above
that this tree is strongly simulated by the structurew.r.t. node s1 of the normative structure in Fig. 4. Themaximal simulating
structure K
T(b),s1
max is the substructure obtained from K
N by deleting the states s2 and s3 (and the associated transitions too)
as well as the transition s4
b−→ s1. The non-simulating remainder structure is obtained from KN by deleting the worlds
4 Note that t′ S s′ actually follows from the first two requirements (t S s∧ γ ⊆ γ ′). We mention it in the definition for the convenience of the reader, because
it is important to keep in mind that the states that the definition recursively visits are all simulating some node in the tree.
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Table 2
Semantics for the deontic modalities over synchronous actions.
KN , i | ϕ iff i ∈ V(ϕ).
KN , i | ⊥
KN , i | C1 → C2 iff whenever KN , i | C1 then KN , i | C2.
KN , i | OC(α) iff T(α) S i KN , and
∀t γ−→ t′ ∈ T(α), ∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KN s.t. t S s ∧ γ ⊆ γ ′ ,
∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then ◦a ∈ (s′), and
∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KT(α),irem ,
∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ ′ then ◦a ∈ (s′), and
KN , s | C ∀s ∈ KN with t Ss s ∧ t ∈ leafs(T(α)).
KN , i | FC(α) iff T(α) S˜ i KN then
∀σ ∈ T(α) a final path s.t. σ S i KN ,
∀t γ−→ t′ ∈ σ , ∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KN with t S s ∧ γ ⊆ γ ′ ,
∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ ′ then •a ∈ (s′) and
KN , s | C ∀s ∈ KN with t S s ∧ t ∈ leafs(σ ).
KN , i | P(α) iff T(α) S i KN , and
∀t γ−→ t′ ∈ T(α), ∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KN s.t. t S s ∧ γ ⊆ γ ′ ,
∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then •a ∈ (s′).
s3, s4, and s5. For the more complex action from Fig. 2 the non-simulating remainder is the substructure that has only the
worlds s1 and s5 and the transition between them. 
Intuitively, the maximal simulating structure captures all and only those transitions from the initial normative structure
that enter in the simulation relation w.r.t. a tree. The non-simulating remainder structure captures all those transitions
that do not enter the simulation relation but that somehow relate to (or simulate) the complement of the tree (or only
that part of the complement tree that is in the normative structure that we talk about). Anticipating the semantics, the
maximal simulating structure is used for marking states with ◦ marks, whereas the non-simulating remainder is used to
determine which state should necessarily not be marked. In few words, the maximal simulating structure has all and only
those transitions from the normative structure that enter the simulation relation. The non-simulating remainder has those
transitions that didnot enter in the simulation relationbutwhich are directly connected to themaximal simulating structure.
We have now all the necessary definitions to introduce the semantics of our deonticmodalities over synchronous actions.
Definition 3.6 (Semantics). We give in Table 2 a recursive definition of the satisfaction relation | of a formula C w.r.t. a
pointed normative structure 〈KN , i〉; it is written KN , i | C and is read as “C is satisfied in the normative structure KN
at state i”. We write KN , i | C whenever KN , i | C is not the case. We say that “C is globally satisfied in KN ”, and write
KN | C iff ∀s ∈ KN , KN , s | C. A formula is satisfiable iff ∃KN , ∃s ∈ KN s.t. KN , s | C. A formula is valid (denoted | C)
iff ∀KN , KN | C.
The propositional connectives have the classical semantics. More interesting and particular to our logic is the interpre-
tation of the deontic modalities.
For OC the semantics has basically two parts:
• The first part of the semantics is the interpretation of the obligation.
– The first line says how to walk on the structure depending on the tree of the action α. The test for simulation must
succeed, which means that all the tree of the action is found in the structure also. The simulation relation is used
because in the structure there may be transitions labeled with actions that are greater than the actions in α, which
intuitively, if we do these actions then the obligation of α is still respected. The simulation relation also takes care
that all the choices of an action appear as transitions in the structure. We cannot specify an obligation of an action
that does not appear as the label of some transition in the normative structure; this would mean that the action is
forbidden (as we see further).
The simulation relation makes sure that in the normative structure however one would choose some transition
that has label respecting the action, from the state reached the simulation of the rest of the action can continue
(this is from the second condition in the Definition 3.3 of simulation). We do not require only that it exists some
such choice of transition (i.e., only the first condition of Definition 3.3), but that with any such good choice one can
continue to simulate the rest of the action.
– The second and third lines mark all the transitions (their ending states) of the structure which simulate edges from
the tree with markers ◦a corresponding to the labels of the simulated edge. This is needed both for the proof of the
synchrony property OC(α) ∧ OC(β) → OC(α×β) and also in proving OC(α) → ¬FC(α) which relates obligations
and prohibitions.
In this part of the semantics we work in the maximal simulating structure. This part is where is checked that the
transitions are actually obligatory (or precisely, part of their labels, because we are interested only in the labels
C. Prisacariu, G. Schneider / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 81 (2012) 458–490 471
of the tree, which may be smaller than those in the maximal simulating structure). Intuitively, we require that all
simulating transitions be labeled by ◦ markers because otherwise it would mean that there are ways to do the next
step of the action which the normative structure sees as not being obligatory, but they could even be forbidden.
– Lines four and five ensure that no other reachable relevant transitions of the structure (i.e., from the non-simulating
remainder structure) are marked with obligationmarkers ◦. This is essential in the proof of the key Lemma A.1 (see
Appendix A)5 of the synchrony result given in Theorem 3.21.
Because of this last requirement we can have several unwanted implications (as are called later in Proposition 3.25)
an example being that the obligation of a choice of actions does not imply that one of the choices is obligatory alone
(here this part of the semantics plays a crucial role).
Intuitively we have only one single obligation of a big complex action and all the transitions in the normative
structure that simulate the tree of this big action aremarked according to the lines two and three from before. Lines
four and five say that anything else outside this big action should not bemarkedwith◦markers. From the unwanted
implications of Proposition 3.25 one can see that there is little compositionality when it comes to obligations. A
compositional result for CL is that of Theorem 3.21 which puts together two contract clauses, each specifying the
obligation of someaction, into one single obligation of a bigger action that comes from the synchronous composition
of the two smaller actions (i.e., the two actions must be done at the same time).
• The second part is just the last line and states that if the obligation is violated (i.e., the complement α of the action is
performed) then the reparation C should hold at every possible violating state. This part of the definition is similar to
the definition of the box modality of PDL only that here it is applied to the complement of the action. We look at the
leafs of the tree T(α) and because the α contains all possible violating actions it is enough to use strong simulation
and thus look in the normative structure for exactly the same labels as the ones in the tree of the complement action.
For the FC modality:
• We use partial simulation S˜ i in order to have our intuition that if an action is not present as a label of a transition of
the model then the action is by default considered forbidden.
• In the second linewe consider all final paths in order to respect the intuition that prohibition of a choicemust prohibit
all, i.e., F(a + b) = F(a) ∧ F(b). Note that we are interested only in final paths simulated by the structure because
for the other paths some of the transitions are missing in the structure and thus there is some action on the sequence
which is forbidden.
• In the third linewe consider all the edges on each final path in order to respect the intuition that forbidding a sequence
means forbidding all the actions on that sequence. For a chosen edge we look for all the transitions of the normative
structure from the chosen node which have a label greater than the label of the edge; this is in order to respect the
intuition that forbidding an action implies forbidding any action that is greater, i.e., F(a) → F(a×b). For the same
reason we need to mark with • markers corresponding to the label of the transition and not to the label of the edge
of the tree, as we do for obligations.
• The last line states that if the prohibition is violated then the reparation Cmust hold in all the stateswhere the violation
is observed. A violation of a prohibition is observed at the states simulating the leaf nodes of the final paths that we
consider. This is because in these states it means that we executed the whole complex action α that was prohibited
(precisely, one of its branches).
The semantics of P specifies that • markers should not be present in order to capture the principle that what is not
forbidden is permitted. The semantics of O, P, or F hint at the trace-based semantics of Process Logic [34] and to some extent
to the modalities of [47].
Note that we need two kinds of markers: ◦ and •. The • marker is for determining which actions are prohibited. The
missing of the • marker is for permissions. Whereas the ◦ marker (which requires that the forbid marker is not present) is
for obligations.
Example 3.3. Consider the normative structure from Fig. 4. In state s3 the obligation O(p)
6 holds. In fact we could have
any reparation because there is no other transition represented in this normative structure, and therefore, the last condition
in the semantics of O is trivially satisfied (i.e., O(p) and OC(p) also hold for any contract clause C). But the fact that even
O⊥(p) holds tells us that in this state there is a categorical obligation. This showed that a particular state is characterized by
all the formulas that hold at that state.
In the same structure at state s1, O(p) does not hold (i.e., s1 | O(p)) because there are other outgoing transitions
from s1 that are marked with ◦. For the same reason s1 | O(d×n). But also s1 | O(p×b) because the ◦b is not marking
state s4. In state s1 we actually have an obligation of a choice: s1 | O(p+d×n). There are othermore informative formulas
that hold in s1, formulas that talk about the possible reparations in case of violating this obligation: s1 | O(φ∧φ′)(p+ d×n).
5 All lemmas and corollaries starting with ‘A’ are auxiliary results presented (together with their proofs) in Appendix A.
6 Recall that we omit the reparation when this one is just⊥.
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In the same state s1 we have also a prohibition: F(b) because state s5 is marked by •b. Actually the same reparation as
before can be attached to this prohibition also: s1 | F(φ∧φ′)(b).
3.1. Decidability for deontic modalities
We prove that the deontic modalities over synchronous actions have the tree model property. It was argued [17,48] that
the tree model property is an more basic property of many modal logics than decidability is. Decidability proofs for modal
logics are often based on a tree model property; and this is the method that we use in this section. There are several ways
of proving decidability starting from a tree model property. In this section we use the selectionmethod. Moreover, there are
modal logics that have the tree model property but are not decidable. In Section 4 we show that the general CL logic has the
tree model property, but we do not manage to show full decidability.
The road-map for this section is to show first that the deontic modalities as defined above have the tree model property
(in Corollary 3.10). Then we use the method of selection to show that this tree can be pruned in such a way that we are left
with a finite tree (cf. Lemma 3.15) that is related to the initial structure and formula in the way that if the formula holds in
the initial structure at some node then it will also hold in the root of this finite tree (i.e., Theorem 3.9). From this we get the
result of decidability of satisfiability for the deontic modalities of CL; i.e., we can check if a formula is satisfiable, and this
amounts to checking all such finite trees related to the formula in question.
Intuitively, the tree model property says that instead of working with arbitrary Kripke-like models, which have a graph
structure, it is enough toworkwithmodels thathavea tree-like structure. Treesaremuchsimpler andwell behavedstructures
than graphs are. Moreover, there are well established techniques for modal logics and trees.
Definition 3.7. A pointed tree structure 〈TKN , ε〉 = (WT , RT
2AB , V
T , T ), is a pointed normative structure 〈KN , s〉 satisfying
the restrictions of Definition 2.9 and:
(a) the nodes are characterized by strings over natural numbersWT ⊂ N∗, with s = ε;
(b) for each label α ∈ 2AB the partial function RT
2AB (α) : WT → WT respects the restriction: RT2AB (α)(x) = xn where
x, xn ∈ WT and n ∈ N;
(c) for any α = β ∈ 2AB then RT
2AB (α)(x) = RT2AB (β)(x) for any x ∈ WT .
Condition (a) above labels each state with a (unique) string over natural numbers. Condition (b) guarantees that the
structure contains no cycles, and (c) that two transitions starting in the same state and with different labels (actions) go to
different states. The definition is for standard tree structures (with labels on their edges) but the notation used is adapted
to the proofs below (the notation is taken from similar proofs of decidability, e.g., in [4,20]).
The following lemma shows that it is always possible to obtain a pointed tree structure from a given pointed normative
structure (it is an adaptation of the standard unfolding construction).
Lemma 3.8 (Tree model). Given a pointed normative structure 〈KN , i〉 we can construct an associated tree structure 〈TKN , ε〉.
Proof. The technique that we use is known in modal logics as the tree unfolding of a Kripke structure [20,42]. For a pointed
normative structure 〈KN , i〉 = (W, R2AB , V, )we can view the set of worldsW = {0, 1, 2, . . . } to be the natural numbers
N; and we define the setWT [i] ⊂ N∗ to be the set of finite paths starting from i. Moreover, we enrich the paths to contain
also the labels by which the path was formed. For this we interplace between the nodes labels from 2AB . More precisely, i is
considered the empty string ε, the paths of depth one are εαs such that s ∈ W and i α−→ s is a transition in KN . We define a
function ρ : WT [i] → W which assigns to each path the state in which the path ends; e.g., ρ(εαs′βs′′) = s′′. Note that two
paths xαs and xβs are regarded as different. Consider the setW[i] = {ρ(x) | x ∈ WT [i]} of states reachable (by any path)
from the node i. The function ρ : WT [i] → W[i] is a surjection therefore it exists the corresponding function ρ−1 which
returns sets of traces fromWT [i].
For the pointed normative structure 〈KN , i〉 we construct the pointed tree structure 〈TKN , ε〉 = (WT [i], RT
2AB , V
T , T ).
The function RT
2AB assigns a partial function R
T
2AB (α) : WT [i] → WT [i] to each α (we write the partial functions as sets of
pairs of argument/value) which is defined as:
RT
2AB (α) = {(x, xαs) | (ρ(x), s) ∈ R2AB (α)}.
The valuation function VT is defined in terms of V:
VT (φ) = ρ−1(V(φ)).
Above, we used the standard pointwise extension of the function ρ−1 over a set of elements as argument. The marking
function T is defined in terms of :
T (x) = (ρ(x)).
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It is easy to see that 〈TKN , ε〉 is a tree structure with root node ε. We can check that 〈TKN , ε〉 is a normative structure.
The restrictions imposed by Definition 3.7 on the function RT
2AB are met. Precisely, for any of the partial functions R
T
2AB (α)
it cannot be the case that RT
2AB (α)(x) = yαs where x = y (i.e., the first restriction is met). Take now two different actions
α = β then it cannot be the case that RT
2AB (α)(x) = RT2AB (β)(x) because RT2AB (α)(x) = xαs = xβs′ = RT2AB (β)(x) even if
s = s′. 
The following result relates satisfiability of a contract in trees and normative structures. It is the essence of the treemodel
property. Intuitively, if a formula holds at a state in a normative structure then the formula holds at the root of the tree
obtained from the unfolding of the normative structure starting with that particular state.
Theorem 3.9. For a pointed structure 〈KN , i〉 we have:
TKN , x | C iff KN , ρ(x) | C (1)
TKN , ε | C iff KN , i | C. (2)
Proof. The proof of (2) follows from (1) by replacing x with ε (and thus ρ(ε) = i). The proof of (1) is done by induction on
the structure of the formula C. It has lengthy but easy cases as it needs to prove each of the conditions in the definitions of
the semantics of the deontic modalities.
Basis: The case for when C = ⊥ is trivial. The second base case is when C = φ. Then TKN , x | φ iff x ∈ VT (φ)
which means that ρ(x) ∈ ρ(VT (φ)). By the definition of VT from Lemma 3.8 it means that ρ(x) ∈ ρ(ρ−1(V(φ))) which is
ρ(x) ∈ V(φ). This is equivalent to KN , ρ(x) | φ and the proof is finished.
Case for C = P(α). We prove that TKN , x | P(α) iff KN , ρ(x) | P(α).
First we prove that T(α) Sx TKN iff T(α) Sρ(x) KN , which is equivalent to proving r S x iff r S ρ(x), where r is the root of
T(α). Because we use this result in several places we refer to it as the simulation result. The Definition 3.3 says that from r S x
we have that ∀r α×−→ t ∈ T(α) then ∃x γ−→ xγ s ∈ TKN s.t. α× ⊆ γ and t S xγ s (where, throughout this proof, we consider
s ∈ N). More precisely, x γ−→ xγ s ∈ TKN means that (x, xγ s) ∈ RT
2AB (γ ), which, by the definition of R
T
2AB from Lemma 3.8,
implies that (ρ(x), s) ∈ R2AB (γ ). Thus we have that ∀r α×−→ t ∈ T(α) then ∃ρ(x) γ−→ s ∈ KN s.t. α× ⊆ γ . By applying a
recursive reasoningwith t S xγ swe also get that t S s in KN . The recursive reasoning is possible because the trees associated
to deontic actions are finite, i.e., have finite height. This means that eventually we reach a leaf node in the tree (say t); and
any leaf node is trivially simulated by any state (as from a leaf there is no edge to look at). To finish the simulation result
we prove the second condition from the definition of the simulation relation. We use reductio ad absurdum and assume
∃ρ(x) γ−→ s ∈ KN with α× ⊆ γ for which t S s is not the case. From Lemma 3.8 we know that ∃x γ−→ xγ s ∈ TKN ,
and from T(α) Sx TKN we also know that ∀x γ−→ xγ s ∈ TKN with α× ⊆ γ we have t S xγ s which, by a similar recursive
argument, means that t S s, hence the contradiction. The proof for the right to left direction is analogues, using Lemma 3.8.
We continue to prove the second condition from the definition of the semantics of P; i.e.
∀r γ−→ t ∈ T(α), ∀x γ
′
−→ xγ ′s ∈ TKN s.t. r S x ∧ γ ⊆ γ ′
then ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then •a ∈ T (xγ ′s)⇔
∀r γ−→ t ∈ T(α), ∀ρ(x) γ
′
−→ s ∈ KN s.t. r S ρ(x) ∧ γ ⊆ γ ′
then ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then •a ∈ (s).
Consider the implication “⇒”. For an arbitrary ρ(x) γ
′
−→ s ∈ KN we know from Lemma 3.8 that ∃x γ
′
−→ xγ ′s ∈ TKN
and from the hypothesis we know that ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then •a ∈ T (xγ ′s). By the definition of T , from Lemma 3.8, we
know that T (xγ ′s) = (ρ(xγ ′s)) = (s), and thus, we have our conclusion ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then •a ∈ (s).
Consider now “⇐”. For an arbitrary x γ
′
−→ xγ ′s ∈ TKN we know that we have ∃ρ(x) γ
′
−→ s ∈ KN with ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ
then •a ∈ (s). Consider now, by reductio ad absurdum, that ∃a ∈ AB with a ∈ γ and •a ∈ T (xγ ′s). By the definition of
T we have that •a ∈ (s) which is a contradiction with the hypothesis. Thus the case is finished.
Inductive step:
Case for C = OC(α). 7 We prove that TKN , x | OC(α) iff KN , ρ(x) | OC(α) under the inductive hypothesis ∀x ∈ TKN
then TKN , x | C ⇔ KN , ρ(x) | C.
We have proven that T(α) Sx TKN iff T(α) Sρ(x) KN in the simulation result. We now prove the second requirement from
the definition of the semantics of obligations, i.e., we prove the double implication:
7 For notation simplicity we use the same symbol C, but the C in the subscript of O, the reparation, is not the same as the one on the left of the equal sign, which
comes from the initial enunciation of the theorem.
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∀r γ−→ t ∈ T(α), ∀x γ
′
−→ xγ ′s ∈ TKN s.t. r S x ∧ γ ⊆ γ ′
then ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then ◦a ∈ T (xγ ′s)⇔
∀r γ−→ t ∈ T(α), ∀ρ(x) γ
′
−→ s ∈ KN s.t. r S ρ(x) ∧ γ ⊆ γ ′
then ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then ◦a ∈ (s).
The proof is similar towhatwe did for permissions.We consider only the “⇒” implication. For an arbitraryρ(x) γ
′
−→ s ∈
KN we know that we have x
γ ′−→ xγ ′s ∈ TKN and from the hypothesis we know that ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then ◦a ∈ T (xγ ′s).
By the definition of T we have that ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then ◦a ∈ (s).
To prove the third condition from the definition of the semantics of OC(α) we prove the following double implication:
∀x γ−→xγ s ∈ TKT(α),xrem then ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then ◦a ∈ T (xγ s)⇔
∀ρ(x) γ−→ s ∈ KT(α),ρ(x)rem then ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then ◦a ∈ (s).
We do the proof of “⇒” using the reductio ad absurdum principle (the proof of “⇐” is analogous). Suppose that∃ρ(x) γ−→
s ∈ KT(α),ρ(x)rem and ∃a ∈ AB with a ∈ γ s.t. ◦a ∈ (s). This implies that there also exists the transition x γ−→ xγ s ∈ TKN for
which, from the definition of T from Lemma 3.8, it also holds that ◦a ∈ T (xγ s) = (s). This requires two subcases:
a. x
γ−→ xγ s ∈ TKT(α),xrem which, from the precondition of the implication, means that ◦a ∈ T (xγ s), resulting in a
contradiction;
b. x
γ−→ xγ s ∈ TKT(α),xrem . From the assumption ∃ρ(x) γ−→ s ∈ KT(α),ρ(x)rem , by way of Definition 3.5, it means that
ρ(x) ∈ KT(α),ρ(x)max and ∃ρ(x) α×−→ s′ ∈ KT(α),ρ(x)max . This implies that x ∈ TKT(α),xmax and ∃x α×−→ xα×s′ ∈ TKT(α),xmax , which,
together with the assumption of this case and by way of Definition 3.5, means that x
γ−→ xγ s ∈ TKT(α),xmax . By the
Definition 3.4 of the maximal simulating structure it implies that ∃r α
′×−→ t ∈ T(α) s.t. r S x ∧ (α′× ⊆ γ ) ∧ t S xγ s.
By the reasoning we did at the beginning for the T(α) Sx TKN we conclude that r S ρ(x) ∧ (α× ⊆ γ ) ∧ t S s which
means that ρ(x)
γ−→ s ∈ TKT(α),ρ(x)max . Thus we have a contradiction.
We need to prove the last condition from the definition of the semantics of OC(α); i.e., we prove the double implication:
TKN , x | C ∀x ∈ TKN with t Ss x ∧ t ∈ leafs(T(α))
⇔
KN , s | C ∀s ∈ KN with t Ss s ∧ t ∈ leafs(T(α)).
Here we use the induction hypothesis. We prove only the forward implication by reductio ad absurdum and assume that
∃s ∈ KN s.t. s is reached by following exactly (because of the strong simulation condition Ss ) one final path in the tree
of the complemented action T(α). For this state we assume KN , s | C. We have, thus, the sequence of transitions in KN :
r
α1×−→ 1, 1 α
2×−→ 2, . . . , n − 1 α
n×−→ n (recall that we consider the states of KN to be labeled with natural numbers) where
n = s. For each of these transitions there is a transition in TKN :∃ε α
1×−→ εα1×1,∃εα1×1
α2×−→ εα1×1α2×2, . . . ,∃εα1× . . . n−1
αn×−→
εα1× . . . αn×n. From this and the left part of the implication we have that TKN , εα1× . . . αn×n | C. By the inductive hypothesis
it means that KN , ρ(εα1× . . . αn×n) | C which is KN , n | C (or KN , s | C). Hence, the contradiction and the end of the
proof.
For the natural obligations from Definition 3.19 in the next section we need to treat the naturalness condition too; this
means proving the following double implication:
∃γ s.t. T(α×γ ) .= TKT(α),xmax⇔
∃γ ′ s.t. T(α×γ ′) .= TKT(α),ρ(x)max .
We actually prove that TK
T(α),x
max
.= TKT(α),ρ(x)max which implies that γ = γ ′ solves the double implication. Note first that
TK
T(α),ρ(x)
max is the tree unfolding of the K
T(α),ρ(x)
max maximal simulating structure of K
N w.r.t. the state ρ(x), whereas, TKT(α),xmax
is themaximal simulating structure coming from the tree unfolding of KN w.r.t. the state ρ(x). We use a recursive reasoning
working on levels of the two trees, beginning at the first level of edges, those starting in the roots of the two trees.
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Pick some arbitrary edge ε
γ−→ εγ s ∈ TKT(α),ρ(x)max for which we want to find a corresponding edge in TKT(α),xmax . This
means that it exists ρ(x)
γ−→ s a transition in KT(α),ρ(x)max . 8 Because x is the root of TKT(α),xmax we can find the edge x γ−→
xγ s ∈ TKT(α),xmax , which is the edge we were looking for.
For the forward direction pick some arbitrary edge x
γ−→ xγ s ∈ TKT(α),xmax . This means that we have an edge ρ(x) γ−→
s ∈ KT(α),ρ(x)max which means that we have the desired edge ε γ−→ εγ s ∈ TKT(α),ρ(x)max , as ρ(x) = ρ′(ε).
The case for C = FC(α) follows similar reasoning as for OC only that care must be taken when dealing with the partial
simulation relation S˜ .
The case for the propositional implication uses simple structural induction. 
Note that we have proven Theorem 3.9 both for general CL (i.e., with general obligations) and for CL restricted to natural
obligations, as in the next section, i.e., where we can reason only about natural obligations as the semantics constrains us to.
Corollary 3.10 (Tree model property). If C has a model KN then it has a tree model TKN .
Proof. This follows immediately from Eq. (2) of the Theorem 3.9 which says that if a formula C is true in a state i of a model
KN then there exists a tree model TKN , as in Lemma 3.8, in which the formula is true at state ε. 
Next we prove that the deontic modalities alone have the finite model property. There are several techniques for proving
decidability of modal logics by establishing a finite model property; where a known one is called filtration. Filtration is
especially used for dynamic logics, like the PDL, fromwhich we borrow the dynamic box modality in CL in the next section.
However, it is rather hard to use the filtration technique in our case. In PDL the clever Fischer–Ladner closure was needed so
to determine the subformulas of a dynamicmodality with a complex action inside (e.g., [a · (b+ c)]ϕ). In our case we do not
knowwhat are subformulas of an obligation of a complex action like OC(a · (b+ c)). We use, instead, the selection technique
for proving the finitemodel property [4, sec.2.3]. Selection is known especially formodal logics where a treemodel property
has been established, like is our case. The basic idea is that given a possibly infinite model, the selection technique selects
and removes (possibly infinite) parts of this model eventually ending up with a finite model. This selection and removing is
done carefully so that the satisfiability of the formula of interest is not broken.
Before proving the finite model property (Theorem 3.16) we give some necessary definitions and prove auxiliary results.
Definition 3.11 (Action length). The length of an action α is defined (inductively) as a function l : AD → N from deontic
actions to natural numbers.
• l(1) = l(0) = 0,
• l(a) = 1, for any basic action a of AB,• l(α×β) = l(α + β) = max(l(α), l(β)),
• l(α · β) = l(α) + l(β).
The length function counts the number of actions in a sequence of actions given by the · constructor. It returns the
maximum from all the choices in an action, i.e., the length of the maximal sequence.
The following proposition states that complementing a (complex) action does not increase its length.
Proposition 3.12. For any action α we have l(α) ≤ l(α).
Proof. A careful inspection of the Definition 2.7 of action complement easily shows that α does not add · combinators at
bigger length than those in the canonical form of α. The complement operation is applied recursively and at each recursive
step it generates paths of length 1 for paths of length 1 or greater in the original α; or it generates paths of length 1+ length
generated in the next recursive step. This happens for each · found in α. Therefore, α cannot have paths of greater length
than the paths in α.
It remains to show that the length of an action is greater than the length of its canonical form. Because to obtain the
canonical form of an action it is enough to apply the axioms of Table 1 except (8), cf. Theorem 2.5, we check that for
each axiom the left action has length greater or equal to the right action (as the axioms are directed from left to right).
This check is easy and we skip details. For axioms (1), (2), (10), (11) the left hand side (lhs) has the same length as the
right hand side (rhs) because of the associativity and commutativity properties of the max operation on natural numbers.
Also equal lengths of the actions on both sides of the axioms (4) and (14) comes from idempotence of max. For (5) use
associativity of + over natural numbers. Also equality for axioms (9) and (15), (16) comes from the distributivity of + over
max and of max over max, respectively. For (3), (12), and (6) use the facts that the number 0 is the neutral element for
8 Note that there should be two ρ functions, one coming from the unfolding of KN (which is the one in the double implication) and another ρ′ function (which
is not visible) coming from the unfolding of the K
T(α),ρ(x)
max . Actually here ρ
′(ε) = ρ(x).
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respectively max and +. For axiom (17) we observe that the length of the α× and β× is 1 and also of α××β×; from these,
max(1+ l(α), 1+ l(β)) = 1+max(l(α), l(β)). The only two axioms for which the length of the lhs is strictly greater that
the length of the rhs are (7) and (13), as it is clear that the right hand sides have length 0 which is less than whatever length
the actions on the left hand side have. 
We now relate the length of an action with the height of its tree.
Corollary 3.13. For any action α we have h(T(α)) ≤ h(T(α)) = l(α).
Proof. This is a corollary of both Theorem 2.10 and Proposition 3.12. 
Definition 3.14 (Depth of formula). We define the depth of a formula inductively as a function d from formulas to natural
numbers:
• d(φ) = d(⊥) = 0;
• d(C1 → C2) = max(d(C1), d(C2));• d(P(α)) = l(α);
• d(OC(α)) = d(FC(α)) = l(α) + d(C).
Example 3.4. Consider the action δ = p · b + (d×n) · p · p with its corresponding tree pictured in Fig. 2. The length of δ
is 3, equal to the length of its longer right branch. The tree in Fig. 2 has clearly hight also 3. For a formula like OF⊥(d)(δ) the
depth is 3 + 1, being equal to the length of δ plus the depth of F⊥(d) which is l(d) = 1 plus the depth of⊥which is 0. 
Lemma 3.15. Take a formula C with depth k. If TKN , ε | C then C holds in the root of the tree structure 〈TKN , ε〉 restricted to
paths of maximum depth k (i.e., where all nodes of depth greater than are removed).
Proof. We use induction on the structure of the formula C.
Base case: The proof for formulas ⊥ and φ which have depth 0 is simple as we need to inspect only the root node ε
therefore we need only nodes of depth 0 in the tree structure.
For the formula P(α) which has depth l(α) we need to inspect only those nodes of 〈TKN , ε〉 that respect the simulation
relation. Therefore, the maximum depth of a node is the maximum length in the final paths of T(α), and thus the maximum
depth of the nodes in 〈TKN , ε〉 is h(T(α)) which, by Corollary 3.13, is l(α).
Inductive step: When C is of the form C1 → C2 the depth of the formula is the maximum of the depths of the two
subformulas. The semantics says that we need to check first if C1 holds, which by the inductive hypothesis it means that we
need a subtree of depth at most d(C1). If C1 holds we need to check also C2 which, by the inductive hypothesis, requires also
a subtree of depth at most d(C2). Overall, we need to check a subtree of 〈TKN , ε〉with depth at mostmax(d(C1), d(C2)).
The proof for the formulas OC(α) and FC(α) is similar and we treat here only the proof for obligations. The semantics of
OC(α) says that we need to check first the obligation alone which requires nodes of depth at most h(T(α)) = l(α) because
of the simulation relation. Secondly, we need to check that the reparation C holds at the states corresponding to the leaf
nodes of the complement α. By Corollary 3.13 we know that these states are at depth at most l(α). The induction hypothesis
says that to check C it is required a tree of height at most the depth d(C). Therefore, to check OC(α) it requires to check a
subtree of 〈TKN , ε〉where the nodes have a depth at most l(α) + d(C). 
Based on the above auxiliary results we can prove now the finite model property.
Theorem 3.16 (Finite model property). If a formula has a model then it has a finite model.
Proof. We can work equivalently in pointed structures and then we need to prove that if a formula is satisfied in a pointed
structure then it is satisfied in a finite pointed structure. Take a formula C of depth k which is satisfiable in the pointed
structure KN , i. By Corollary 3.10 we know that C is satisfied in the tree-like pointed structure TKN , ε. Note that the tree
might have both infinite depth and infinite branching.
ByLemma3.15weputaboundon thedepthof the treewhich is related to the formula. Becauseweworkwithdeterministic
structures and because the set of labels 2AB is finite we have a guaranteed finite branching. Therefore the model is finite. 
As a corollary of the above theorem we have a (relative) decidability result.
Corollary 3.17 (Decidability).
a. The logic with general obligations as in the semantic Definition 3.6 is decidable.
b. The logic with natural obligations is decidable iff the naturalness constraint is decidable.
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As a side remark, we have proven the tree model property in Theorem 3.9 for general obligations as well as for natural
obligations. Therefore, in both cases it is enough to check finite trees for satisfiability, but the difference is thatwhen checking
for natural obligations we need to test that the naturalness constraint is satisfied. The decidability of whether an action γ
satisfies the naturalness constraint (cf. Propositional 3.20) has been an open problem for a while. Recent results in [7] (see
details in the technical report [8]) show an algorithm to find a suitable γ if one exists (i.e., a decision procedure is given).
3.2. Properties of the deontic modalities
The semantics of the deontic modalities is rather involved; it is based on an algebraic formalism for the actions which
are interpreted as rooted trees. The information in the trees (compared to sets of traces [34]) is used by the particular notion
of simulation relation to know how to walk on the normative structure in the search of the markings to determine the truth
value of the deontic modality. The rest of the complications in the semantics are necessary for capturing several intuitive
properties of the deontic modalities which we discuss in this section.
The following validities are the counterparts of the ones found in SDL only that here they are in an ought-to-do setting
where the deontic modalities are applied over actions. The following examples give intuition for the logical validities of
Proposition 3.18 (taken from [30] ):
• Obligation of an action implies that the action is permitted:
| OC(α) → P(α).
E.g.: “Client is obliged to pay” then “Client has the right to pay”.
• Permission of performing an action implies that the action is not forbidden:
| P(α) → ¬FC(α).
E.g.: “Provider has the right to alter personal data” then “Provider is not forbidden to alter personal data”.
• If two action expressions represent the same action then the obligation of one action should imply the obligation of
the other action:
if α = β then | OC(α) ↔ OC(β).
E.g.: “pay or delay” is the same as “delay or pay” then “Client is obliged to pay or delay” should be the same as “Client
is obliged to delay or pay”.
• The obligation of the violating action cannot appear in a contract (| ¬OC(0)); obligation of terminating the contract
can be modeled. The obligation to do nothing can be trivially inserted in any contract (| OC(1)).
Proposition 3.18 (Validities). The following statements hold:
| ¬OC(0) (3)
serial | OC(1) (4)
| P(α) → ¬FC(α) (5)
| OC(α) → P(α) (6)
if α = β then | OC(α) ↔ OC(β) (7)
| OC(α) → ¬FC(α) (8)
Proof. For the proof of (3), i.e., | ¬OC(0), we need to show that there is no model which makes OC(0) true. This is because
of the definition of¬OC(0) as OC(0) →⊥which is true only if OC(0) is false. By reductio ad absurdum suppose that it exists
a model which makes OC(0) true. This means (by the definition of the semantics of O) that the tree interpreting 0 must be
simulated by the model. But this is not possible because of the special label Λ appearing in the tree of 0 which does not
appear in the labels of the normative structures.
To prove (4), i.e., that OC(1) is valid in the serial normative structures, take any normative structure that respects the seri-
ality condition from standardmodal logics; i.e., that from each state there exists an outgoing transition. The tree interpreting
1 is trivially simulated by any normative structure because the only edge of the tree is labeled with the empty set and thus
any transition of the structure simulates the edge. The second condition in the semantics of O is satisfied as there is no basic
label a in the label of the edge. It is clear that any edge on the first level of the structure enters into the maximal simulating
structure and therefore the non-simulating remainder K
I(1),i
rem is empty, and the third condition is trivially satisfied. Because
1 = 0 then there is no state s to satisfy the requirements of the last condition and thus it is trivially satisfied too.
Note thatOC(1) is valid only in the serial normative structures, i.e., having from each state at least one outgoing transition.
We consider that seriality is natural to have because in order to be able to say that something is obligatory that something
must exists in the structure (i.e., the actionmust label some transition, even in the case of the empty action 1 and the empty
label { } that models it).
For the proof of (6), i.e., | OC(α) → P(α), take an arbitrary pointed normative structure KN , iwhichmakes OC(α) true.
This means that T(α) S i KN . This is the first part from the semantics of P(α). Moreover, from the semantics of OC(α) we
have that ∀t γ−→ t′ ∈ T(α), ∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KN s.t. t S s∧ γ ⊆ γ ′ then ∀a ∈ γ we have ◦a ∈ (s′). Because of the restriction
on the marking function we get ∀a ∈ γ we have •a ∈ (s′). This makes the second requirement in the semantics of P(α).
For the proof of (5), i.e., | P(α) → ¬FC(α), we use reductio ad absurdum and assume that it exists a pointed structure
KN , i which satisfies P(α) and also FC(α). From the semantics of P, knowing that S ⊆ S˜ , we conclude that T(α) S˜ i KN .
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Fig. 5. Examples for natural obligations.
Now take any final pathσ in the tree ofα; from the semantics of P it holds thatσ S i KN . Moreover, for any edge t
γ−→ t′ ∈ σ
it holds, by the semantics of P, that ∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KN with t S s then ∀a ∈ γ , •a ∈ (s′). But the semantics of FC(α) requires
that ∀a ∈ γ ′ then •a ∈ (s′) which is not possible as γ ⊆ γ ′ (i.e., it exists at least one •a ∈ (s′) with a ∈ γ ′).
To prove (7) notice that the semantics of O is based on the interpretation of the actions as trees. Therefore, because the
actions are equal, the tree interpretations denote the same tree (up to isomorphism). Thus, the semantics for OC(α) is the
same as that for OC(β) because they are working with the same tree T(α)
.= T(β).
The proof of (8) can be obtained from (6) and (5). 
In our ought-to-do setting, the formula OC(1) is the counterpart of the O() from standard deontic logic. As the proof
above shows, this formula is not valid in any normative structure, but only in the serial ones. This formula essentially says
that in any contract any agent is obliged to do action “skip”. This fact is harmless because if there is any other “real” obligation
(in the same world) then the property from Theorem 3.21 below would combine the two obligations and by virtue of the
fact that 1 is identity element for×, the OC(1) will be essentially swallowed by the real obligation. In consequence, OC(1)
is not visible when other obligations are present. Alone, OC(1) requires that any normative structure is serial, i.e., that from
any world there is an outgoing transition. Otherwise, obligation to “skip” does not impose anything; does not impose any
markings in the structure and does not impose any particular labeling of any transition. It has an analogous behavior with
O() of SDL.
In Theorem 3.21 (see below) we give a property for obligations over synchronous actions. The theorem states that if
"there exists an obligation to do action α and there is also an obligation to do action β” (in the same current world) then
we should be able to infer that “there is an obligation to do both actions α and β at the same time”. This property does not
hold for general obligations (with the definition that we gave before), but only for some restricted obligations, which we call
natural obligations.
The purpose of natural obligations is not necessarily a technical one but also a practical one. The naturalness constraint
refersmainly to choices of actions;whendecidingwhich of the actions to choose themodel shouldnot influence thedecision.
Definition 3.19 (Natural obligations). An obligation OC(α) is called natural iff in addition to the semantics of Definition 3.6
the following naturalness constraint is respected:
∃γ s.t. T(α×γ ) .= TKT(α),εmax . (9)
The following result is intended to be the algebraic equivalent of naturalness, and hence, algebraic methods can be
employed to solve it. The proposition provides a practical way to check that the naturalness constraint is satisfied.
Proposition 3.20. The naturalness constraint reduces to showing that there exists a deontic action γ s.t. α×γ = αT , where αT
is the action in canonical form corresponding to the tree TK
T(α),ε
max .
Proof. This is a consequence of the definition above and of the completeness result of [37] which says that for any tree as
in Theorem 2.10 there is a corresponding action. 
Example 3.5. Let us consider the model of Fig. 5-(i) in which O(a + b) holds at state s0. Change this model by adding a
c to the left label and a d to the right label, as in Fig. 5-(ii). O(a + b) still holds at state s0, but is not a natural obligation;
intuitively, when deciding which of a or b to choose one needs to take into account the two distinct actions c and d. If we
were to add the same label c to both branches then the naturalness constraint is satisfied, as one does not care about the
extra action c when choosing. 
Theorem 3.21 (Synchrony property). For natural obligations we have:
| OC(α) ∧ OC(β) → OC(α×β). (10)
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Proof. We need to prove that KN , i | OC(α×β) under the assumption KN , i | OC(α)∧OC(β). Using Lemma A.4 we have
thatT(α×β) S i KN which is thefirst requirement in thesemanticsofOC . For theproofof LemmaA.4 thenaturalness constraint
is essential. The proofs of Lemma A.7 and Lemma A.8 are also based on the naturalness constraint. These two lemmas give
the second and the third requirement in the semantics of OC(α×β). The last requirement is proven as Lemma A.9. 
Wenow show how the above result can be generalized to the conjunction of obligations containing different reparations.
Proposition 3.22. For natural obligations we have:
| OC1(α) ∧ OC2(β) → OC1∨C2(α×β). (11)
Proof. The proof of this result is the same as that for Theorem 3.21 until we need to use Lemma A.9. The statement of this
last lemma needs to be changed accordingly and the new proof needs only little change as we discuss here. What we need
to prove now is that if KN , i | OC1(α)∧ OC2(β) then KN , s | C1 ∨ C2 ∀s ∈ N with t Ss s∧ t ∈ leafs(T(α×β)). The proof
of this result is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma A.9 with the following observations. In the forth paragraph we
proved that from the condition ∀αi××β j× : αi××β j× ⊆ γ we can conclude that either ∀αi× : αi× ⊆ γ or ∀β j× : β j× ⊆ γ . This is
used in the last paragraph by taking one of the hypothesis for which this holds, because it does not make a difference which
hypothesis we take as both have the same reparation C. This is not the case for the present corollary. Here it is important
which of ∀αi× : αi× ⊆ γ or ∀β j× : β j× ⊆ γ holds; but we do not know. Therefore we use the disjunction of the reparations
C1 ∨ C2, and regardless of which of the two holds we use the appropriate hypothesis to make the disjunction true. 
The following corollary points out conflicts that are avoided in the logic because of the semantics. These are usual re-
quirements when reasoning about legal contracts. A contract with two clauses “Obliged to pay” and “Forbidden to pay” can
never be respected. The same with a contract stating “Obliged to go west” and “Obliged to go east” (as “go west” and “go
east” cannot be done at the same time, i.e., are conflicting).
Corollary 3.23 (Conflicts). The following statements hold:
| ¬(OC(α) ∧ FC(α)) (12)
| ¬(P(α) ∧ FC(α)) (13)
if α #C β then | ¬(OC(α) ∧ OC(β)). (14)
Proof. The proof of (12) follows by propositional reasoning from (8) and the proof of (13) follows from (5). The proof of
(14) follows from (3) and Theorem 3.21 as we show next. Because α #C β then α×β = 0, by axiom (18), and therefore
OC(α×β) is OC(0). From Theorem 3.21 we get that | ¬(OC(α)∧ OC(β)) ← ¬OC(α×β) and from the above we have that| ¬(OC(α) ∧ OC(β)) ← ¬OC(0). By modus ponens using (3) we get | ¬(OC(α) ∧ OC(β)). 
We give now some examples for the validities presented in Proposition 3.24 below.
• Prohibition of an action implies that any bigger action is prohibited:
FC(α) → FC(α×β).
E.g.: “Client is forbidden to supply false information” then we also know that “Client is forbidden to supply false
information and at the same time supply correct information”.
We comment more on this property. One may think of an example like “One is forbidden to smoke” but still “One is
permitted to smoke and (at the same time) sit outside in the open air”. This example seems to contradict the above
property. The confusion comes from the wording of the above example. A more correct wording would be: “One is
forbidden to smoke and (at the same time) sit in a public place” where this action is no longer smaller than the action
“smoke and (at the same time) sit outside in the open air” and thus the prohibition and the permission go along
together.
• The prohibition of a choice of two actions α or β is the same as having both prohibition of α and prohibition of β:
FC(α + β) ↔ FC(α) ∧ FC(β).
E.g.: “Client is forbidden to pay in dollars or to pay in euros” implies that “Client is forbidden to pay in dollars” and
that “Client is forbidden to pay in euros”.
• Permission of a choice of actions is the same as permission of all the actions in the choice; i.e., validity (17).
Proposition 3.24. The following statements hold:
| FC(α) → FC(α×β) (15)
| FC(α + β) ↔ FC(α) ∧ FC(β) (16)
| P(α + β) ↔ P(α) ∧ P(β) (17)
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Proof. We give first quick proof arguments. The proof of the first validity is based on the fact that paths in T(α×β) contain
(i.e., have bigger labels than) paths of T(α). The proof of the second validity is based on the fact the paths of T(α +β)which
satisfy the condition in the semantics are the same as the paths of T(α) and T(β) together.
For the proof of (15) consider an arbitrary pointed structure 〈KN , i〉which satisfies FC(α). In order to show that KN , i |
FC(α×β)we need to take an arbitrary final path σ ∈ T(α×β)which satisfies σ S i KN and show that for any edge t γ−→ t′
on this path we have ∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KN with t S s ∧ γ ⊆ γ ′ then ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ ′ then •a ∈ (s′). Note that if a path
σ ∈ T(α×β) exists then it exists also a path σ ′ ∈ T(α)which has all the labels on the edges smaller than the corresponding
ones in σ . Therefore, together with the assumption σ S i KN it means that σ ′ also satisfies σ ′ S i KN . Because of this, we
can apply the semantics for the expression FC(α) to deduce that for all edges t
γ−→ t′ ∈ σ ′ all transitions s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KN
satisfying γ ⊆ γ ′ also satisfy ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ ′ then •a ∈ (s′). For these edges we can find corresponding edges in σ that
have labels γ ′′ which includes γ . Because γ ⊆ γ ′′ it means that all the transitions s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KN that respect γ ′′ ⊆ γ ′ are
among (possibly fewer than) the transitions before, for σ ′. But all these transitions we know that respect ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ ′
then •a ∈ (s′). The proof is finished.
It should be simple to see that the opposite implication does not always hold; i.e., | FC(α×β) → FC(α). This is because
we cannot guarantee that by taking all the paths σ ′ ∈ T(α×β) which satisfy σ ′ S i KN we will consider all the paths
σ ∈ T(α), because there may be paths with labels smaller that those in T(α×β) which are still good paths for T(α) (see
Proposition 3.25 for a counterexample).
The proof of | FC(α +β) ↔ FC(α)∧ FC(β) is simpler. It is easy to see that the tree T(α +β) contains all the final paths
σ of the two trees T(α) and T(β) which satisfy σ S i KN . Therefore, the double implication is immediate: if we consider
FC(α +β) true than the traces in T(α +β) respect all the conditions of the semantics and thus all the traces in T(α) respect
the conditions in the semantics, making FC(α) true (and the same for FC(β)).
The proof of (17) is similar to the proof of (16). 
In the design decisions for CL we give special attention to what we call unwanted implications. This kind of “properties”
are rather scarce and neglected in the literature. We give here unwanted implications that are related only to the deontic
modalities (Proposition 3.25).
• The prohibition of doing two actions at the same time does not imply that any of the two actions is prohibited (i.e.,
the converse of (15) does not always hold).
| FC(α×β) → FC(α).
E.g.: “One is forbidden to drink and drive at the same time” does not imply that “One is forbidden to drink” and neither
that “One is forbidden to drive”.
• Obligation of an action α does not imply obligation of any concurrent action that contains α. Similarly, obligation of
a concurrent action does not imply obligation of any of its composing actions.
| OC(α) → OC(α×β);| OC(α×β) → OC(α).
E.g.: “Obligation to drive” should not imply “Obligation to drive and drink at the same time”. For the second unwanted
implication consider “Obligation to smoke and sit outside” which should not imply “Obligation to smoke”.
• Similarly with permissions:
| P(α) → P(α×β);
| P(α×β) → P(α).
E.g.: “Permitted to smoke and sit outside in open air” does not imply “Permitted to smoke” because if one sits inside
a restaurant then one is forbidden to smoke.
The first implication is related to the free choice permission paradox on page 484 in the setting of concurrent actions,
where from permission to smoke one would imply the permission to smoke and kill at the same time.
• Obligation of a choice of actions constrains that only the actions in the choice can be done but the choice itself is left
open, the one on which the obligation is enforced has the freedom of choosing. Therefore, none of the actions in the
choice is obligatory by itself because the freedom of choosing would be lost.
| OC(α + β) → OC(α);| OC(α) → OC(α + β).
E.g.: “Client is obliged to pay or to delay payment” should not imply that “Client is obliged to delay payment”. For the
second unwanted implication “Obliged to mail the letter” should not imply “Obliged to mail the letter or burn the
letter”.
• As consequence of the above we have:
| OC(α + β) → OC(α×β);| OC(α×β) → OC(α + β).
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Fig. 6. Counterexamples for Proposition 3.25.
Proposition 3.25 (Unwanted implications). The following statements hold:
| OC(α) → OC(α×β) (18)
| OC(α×β) → OC(α) (19)
| OC(α + β) → OC(α×β) (20)
| OC(α×β) → OC(α + β) (21)
| OC(α) → OC(α + β) (22)
| OC(α + β) → OC(α) (23)
| FC(α×β) → FC(α) (24)
| P(α×β) → P(α) (25)
| P(α) → P(α×β) (26)
| P(α) → P(α + β). (27)
Proof. The proof is simple by giving for each not valid statement a counterexample, all of which are collected in Fig. 6. The
model of Fig. 6(i) makes OC(a) true in state i but OC(a×b) does not hold (for (18)) and neither does OC(a + b) (for (22)). In
the model of Fig. 6(ii) OC(a×b) holds in state i but OC(a) does not hold (for (19)) and also OC(a+ b) does not hold (for (21)).
In the model of Fig. 6(iii) OC(a + b) holds in state i but OC(a×b) does not hold (for (20)) and also OC(a) does not hold (for
(23)). The model of Fig. 6(iv) makes FC(a×b) true in state i but the same state does not make FC(a) true (for (24)). For (25)
take the structure in Fig. 6(ii) which is a model for P(α×β) but not a model for P(α). For (26) Fig. 6(i) is an obvious example,
and as well for (27) because the model satisfies P(a) but not P(a + b). 
4. The full contract logic
The contract logic CL adds to the deonticmodalities from Section 3 the dynamic logicmodality applied over synchronous
actions.
Definition 4.1. The syntax of CL is given in Table 3. The dynamic logic modality [·]C is parameterized by the dynamic
actions δ. The expression [δ]C is read as: “after the action δ is performed C must hold”. The other propositional operators
are, as before, defined in terms of two (functionally complete set) {→,⊥}, whereas the dynamic existential modality 〈δ〉C
is defined as the dual of box: 〈δ〉C = ¬[δ]¬C.
In CL we can write conditional obligations, permissions and prohibitions of two different kinds. As an example let us
consider conditional obligations. The first kind is represented by [δ]O(α), which may be read as “after performing δ, one is
obliged to do α”. The second kind is modeled using the implication operator: C → O(α), which is read as “If C holds then
one is obliged to perform α”.
Propositional dynamic logic (PDL)makes an interplay between the actions and the formulas; i.e., it has formulas as actions
(tests ϕ?) and it has actions defining the formulas (the box modality [δ]). The intuition of the test action is that ϕ? can be
performed only if the formula ϕ holds in the current world. A sequence action ϕ? · α can be viewed as a guarded action
because α can be performed only if the test ϕ? succeeds. Note that we use, what is called, poor tests as we do not allow for
a modal formula to be a test, but only Boolean tests; i.e., we cannot ask modal questions using the dynamic or the deontic
modalities.
There are two differences between the actions δ which appear inside the PDL modality [·] and the actions α which are
allowed inside thedeonticmodalities.Wearguedbefore against not having theKleene ∗ for theα actions. Regarding the tests,
if we allow deontic test actions, like F(α)? inside the deontic modalities it would break the ought-to-do approach because
Table 3
Syntax of the contract language CL.
C := φ | OC(α) | P(α) | FC(α) | C → C | [δ]C | ⊥ (CL expressions)
α := a | 0 | 1 | α×α | α · α | α + α (deontic actions)
δ := a | 0 | 1 | δ×δ | δ · δ | δ + δ | δ∗ | ϕ? (dynamic actions)
ϕ := φ | 0 | 1 | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ (tests)
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Table 4
Semantics for CL.
KN , i | [δ]C iff ∀s ∈ KN with (i, s) ∈ R2AB (δ) then KN , s | C.
R2AB (δ) = {(s, s′) | ∃k, ∃σ = σ0 . . . σk a final path in AG(δ),∃s0 . . . sk ∈ KN with s0 = s and sk = s′ , and
∀0 ≤ i ≤ k, V(si) ∈ L(σi), and
∀0 ≤ i < k with σi α
i×−→ σi+1 ∈ σ then (si, si+1) ∈ R2AB (αi×)}
they introduce the formulas inside the action formalism; i.e., we could write formulas like OC(F(α)?). This constitutes
a combination of ought-to-do and ought-to-be (for this direction check [13]). Moreover, adding tests inside the deontic
modalities does not integrate with our way of giving semantics; we do not know how to mark obligatory (or prohibited)
tests, as we do with the actions. Moreover, in case of violation, the reparation C is enforced in the same world as the O and
the F , i.e., there is no state change. Therefore, we could reason only with the propositional logic part of CL. The example
OC(F(α)?) is read as “It is obligatory (in the current world) that the test F(α)? holds (in the current world), otherwise (if
the test does not hold) the reparation C should be enforced afterwards”. Compared to deontic actions, tests do not change
the world: if a tests succeeds then we remain in the same world and execute the next action, if the test fails then the whole
action sequence fails. We can achieve the same by only using the CL language as it is. The example above is specified in CL
as F(α) ∨ (¬F(α) ∧ C)which is read as above (we reword it here to match the formula better): “(In the current world) it is
forbidden to do α or it is not forbidden to do α and the formula C holds”.
Definition 4.2 (Semantics). The semantics for the dynamic modality of CL is given in Table 4. The rest of the syntactic
constructs of CL (i.e., the deontic and propositional operators) have the semantics from Table 2.
The expression [δ]C is evaluated in a state i of the normative structure KN , depending on the automata representation
of the dynamic action δ. Essentially, the semantics needs to evaluate the expression C to true in all states s reachable from
the initial state i by following the automaton AG(δ) of the dynamic action δ. All the states s reached from i are given by the
relation described by the dynamic action, i.e., (i, s) ∈ R2AB (δ). The relation R2AB (δ) is not as simple to describe as was the
case with the deontic actions where we needed to look only at single steps. In the case of dynamic actions we need to look
several steps in the structure. We take the approach introduced in [19] and use the automata AG(δ), as in Definition 2.14,
interpreting the dynamic actions δ.
The relation R2AB (δ) is defined as the set of all pairs of states (s, s
′) having the property that there is an accepting pathσ in
AG(δ) that ismatchedby a sequence of states inKN . A sequence of statesmatches thepathσ iff all the edgesσi
α×−→ σi+1 ∈ σ
are matched by the corresponding transitions (si, si+1) ∈ R2AB (α×) (i.e., the indexes have to match as well as the labels
α×) and the valuation for the states has to conform with the sets of atoms of the corresponding nodes on the path (i.e.,
V(si) ∈ L(σi)). From this matching sequence of states take the first and the final state as the pair we are looking for. The
conformance test V(si) ∈ L(σi) is required to ensure than any test action from δ is satisfied at the particular state; i.e.,
if the valuation of the state corresponds to one of the atoms (atoms are encodings of valuations) that are encoded by the
automaton σi of the node σi.
Example 4.1. Consider the normative structure of Fig. 4 changed s.t. the transition (s1, s4) is labeled only by {p}. Also
consider the automaton AG(δ) from Fig. 3 corresponding to the dynamic action δ = (p · b)∗ + (d×n) · ϕ? · p · p. This
time we assume that the complex test ϕ? is a conjunction that contains φ′; therefore this test fails in all states where
the propositional constant φ′ is not present. We want to check if the formula [δ]φ holds in state s1. The automaton AG(δ)
has the following final paths: {(r, t1, t2, t3), (r, t6), (r, t4, t5), (r, t4, t5, (t4, t5)∗)}. We calculate R2AB (δ) = {(s1, s1)}. At
a closer look, the path (r, t1, t2, t3) does not contribute to the R2AB (δ) because V(s2) ∈ L(t1) (i.e., the automaton t1
accepts only atoms that make ϕ true, but V(s2)makes φ′ false, hence ϕ false). Also path (r, t6) does not contribute, but the
paths (r, t4, t5, (t4, t5)
∗) arematched by sequences of states s1, s4, s1 and s1, s4, s1, (s4, s1)∗. Therefore, s1 | [δ]φ because
s1 | φ. Consider now a slight modification δ′ = (p · b)∗ + (d×n) · p · p (i.e., the test ϕ? does not appear). In this case the
language L(t1) is the universal language (i.e., all the atoms) and hence, the path (r, t1, t2, t3) now contributes to R2AB (δ)
by adding the pair (s1, s4). Because of this s1 | [δ′]φ since one of the pairs in R2AB (δ) does not respect the condition of the
semantics; i.e., s4 | φ. Consider a subsequent modification δ′′ = (p · b)∗ + (d×n) · p (i.e., the last p action is removed).
The automaton AG(δ) from Fig. 3 has the node t3 removed, and thus the final path (r, t1, t2) contributed to R2AB (δ)with the
pair (s1, s3). In this case s1 | [δ′′]φ because in both s1 and s3 the formula φ holds. Consider a last modification of δ′′ to
δ′′′ = (p · φ′? · b)∗ + (d×n) · p. In this case all the paths (r, t4, t5, (t4, t5)∗) cannot contribute to R2AB (δ) any more because
the valuation V(s4) does not make φ′ true and hence is not part of L(t4) which contains only those atoms that make φ′
true; nevertheless s1 | [δ′′′]φ since in the only remaining state s3 we have s3 | φ. 
4.1. Properties of the CL logic
The validities and non-validities results for the deontic modalities of Section 3.2 hold for CL also. Adding the dynamic
modality does not affect these. Besides, we have extra properties that deal with the combination of deontic and dynamic
modalities.
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Denote by any = +α×∈A×B α× the choice between all the×-actions. For all α× ∈ A
×
B denote by 〈〈α×〉〉C the formula
〈α××any〉C and by [[α×]]C the formula [α××any]φ. Note that 〈〈·〉〉 and [[·]] are duals in this definition. Extend [[·]] to all
actions α ∈ A, as is done in the standard PDL (the definition for 〈〈·〉〉 is analogous):
[[α + β]]C = [[α]]C ∧ [[β]]C
[[α · β]]C = [[α]][[β]]C
[[α∗]]C = C ∧ [[α]][[α∗]]C.
Remark that the syntactic construct [[·]] enhances the [·] only locally, i.e., only for one step moves. It enhances in the
sense that it contains not only those single transitions labeled by {α×} but also those labeled by set labels that include {α×},
i.e., are bigger, up to the biggest label AB.
An important requirement when modeling electronic contracts is that the obligation of a sequence of actions OC(α · α′)
must be equal to the obligation of the first action OC(α) and after the first obligation is respected the second obligationmust
hold OC(α′). To respect the obligation OC(α) means to do any action bigger than α which is captured with the syntactic
construction [[·]]. Note that ifOC(α) is violated then the reparation Cmust be enforced (must hold) and the second obligation
is discarded, i.e., is not necessarily enforced.
Proposition 4.3. The following statements hold:
| [[α×]]C → [[α××β×]]C (28)
| OC(α · β) ↔ OC(α) ∧ [[α]]OC(β) (29)
| FC(α · β) ↔ F(α) ∧ [[α]]FC(β) (30)
where α×, β× ∈ A×B.
Proof. The proof of (28) is easy as we are concerned only with×-actions. Trivially, for an action α× the tree of the action
α××any has all edges with labels including α× (the tree has height 1). Similarly, all the edges of the tree of α××β××any
contain α××β× and, because α× ⊆ α××β×, they contain also α×. Because of these, all the transitions in the structure that
are relevant for evaluating [[α××β×]]C are part of the transitions relevant for [[α×]]C and, hence, C holds in all their ending
states. Proof finished as whenever [[α×]]C holds in a state, [[α××β×]]C holds too.
To prove (29) we need a series of results which are easy to check but tedious; we just state these results. To prove the
left to right implication it is easy to see that OC(α · β) → OC(α) as we discuss further. Trivially, T(α) ⊂ T(α · β) from
which it is easy to deduce that if T(α · β) S i KN then T(α) S i KN (i.e., the first line in the semantics of OC(α)). From the
same results above it is clear that all the transitions s
γ ′−→ s′ ∈ KN that are relevant for the semantics of OC(α) are among
the transitions that are relevant in the semantics of OC(α · β) and hence they respect the second condition in the semantics
of obligation. A second result easy to verify is that K
T(α),i
rem ⊂ KT(α·β),irem which implies trivially the third condition in the
semantics of OC(α). Related to this result is that T(α) ⊆ T(α · β) which means that leafs(T(α)) ⊆ leafs(T(α · β)) which
makes the last requirement in the semantics of OC(α) trivially true.
To finish the left to right implication we prove OC(α · β) → [[α]]OC(β). Recall that the construction of T(α · β) first
constructs T(α) and T(β) and then just attaches the whole T(β) to all the leafs of T(α) (i.e., replaces each leaf with the root
of T(β)). The action α is a deontic action and, hence, its interpretation is a tree and the semantics of [[·]] follows all the
transitions in KN that are bigger than the edges of this tree. Therefore, these are all the transitions that participate in the
T(α · β) S i KN ; actually in the second condition of the simulation relation. This simple observation gives all the rest of the
proof; it implies that all the states where we have to evaluate OC(β) are part of T(α · β) S i KN , actually T(β) Ss KN where
s is related to the leafs of T(α). The second and third conditions in the semantics of OC(β) in the states s follow similarly.
The last condition holds because T(β) ⊆ T(α · β).
The proof of the right to left implication follows a similar tedious argument but the main intuition is as follows. To get
the semantics of OC(α · β) we need to achieve two main goals: (1) to walk on the KN structure according to T(α · β) and
to find all the appropriate ◦ markers, (2) C must hold at the appropriate violating states. Walking on KN goes well and finds
all the necessary markers until reaching the leaf nodes of the first part of the tree, i.e., of T(α), because it comes from the
semantics of OC(α). Nevertheless, we can continue because all these states are the same as the states reached through [[α]].
Therefore, because of the semantics of OC(β) from all these states we can continue until we reach the leaf nodes of the big
tree T(α · β). For the second part it is easy to see that all the states of KN reached because of the tree T(α · β) are the same
as the states reached because of the tree T(α) together with those reach through making first α and then following T(β).
The proof of (30) is similar only that it reasons about partial simulations. To remark is that the first prohibition has a
trivial reparation. From a practical point of view the prohibition is irrelevant because it does not impose any restrictions.
Technically, the reparation C holds (is enforced) only in the states corresponding to the leafs of the tree T(α · β), therefore,
there is no information about what holds at the leafs of T(α). 
The validity (30) hints at the fact that prohibitions as defined in CL could be modeled using the dynamic operator [·] (or
maybe using the syntactic construct [[·]]), but this is a simply a conjecture at the moment of writing this paper.
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The PDL version with automata inside the dynamic modality from [19] is proven decidable with a method that builds
finite models based on a variant of Fischer–Ladner closure and using Hintikka-like sets. This proof can be easily adapted to
our automata over guarded synchronous strings and to our dynamic modality over synchronous actions. Therefore, if we
consider only the propositional part and the dynamic modality of CL we have a decidable extension of PDL which can talk
about synchronous actions. Unfortunately,we couldnot give aproof of decidability for thedeonticmodalities using a Fischer–
Ladner closure method. Therefore, we cannot combine the proof based on finite tree models for the deontic modalities with
a proof based on Fischer–Ladner closure for the dynamic modality to obtain the decidability of the full CL.
On the other hand, the PDL logic does not have the finite tree model property because of the Kleene ∗. This applies to
our dynamic modality over synchronous actions too. However, we show in Theorem 4.4 that the dynamic modality over
synchronous actions has the tree model property. This together with Theorem 3.9 give the tree model property for full CL.
From the treemodel one just needs to find the right selectionmethod to obtain a bounded treemodel property (i.e., bounded
branching) aswas done for themodalμ-calculus [22,45]. Using this, one can prove decidability by a standard translation into
the SnS logic which is decidable [40]. Although standard, these techniques are specific and quite involved. In consequence
we left the work of investigating and adapting these techniques to the setting of CL as an open problem for future work.
Theorem 4.4 (Tree model for CL). For a pointed structure 〈KN , i〉 we have:
TKN , x | [δ]C iff KN , ρ(x) | [δ]C. (31)
Proof. The proof follows the semantics of [·] and uses an argument similar to what we did in the proof of Theorem 3.9 for
the last part of the case for obligations. This means we use structural induction and assume TKN , x′ | C iff KN , ρ(x′) | C.
For the left to right implication we use reductio ad absurdum and assume that ∃s ∈ KN s.t. (ρ(x), s) ∈ R2AB (δ) for
which KN , s | C. Having (ρ(x), s) ∈ R2AB (δ) it means that ∃σ = σ0 . . . σk a final path in AG(δ) and ∃s0 . . . sk ∈ KN s.t.
s0 = ρ(x), sk = s, ∀0 ≤ i ≤ k, V(si) ∈ L(σi), and for any σi α
i×−→ σi+1 ∈ σ we have (si, si+1) ∈ R2AB (αi×). By Lemma 3.8
it means that for (ρ(x), s1) ∈ R2AB (α0×) we find (x, xα0×s1) ∈ RT2AB (α0×); and the same for all i, ending with the transition
(xα0× . . . sk−1, xα0× . . . αk−1× sk)∈RT2AB (αk−1× ). Because the valuation functions V and VT agree on all propositional constants
φ it means that VT (xα0× . . . si) ∈ L(σi). In this waywe have found for the final path σ the sequence of states x, xα0×s1, . . . ,
xα0× . . . αk−1× sk in the tree model that satisfy the conditions for (x, xα0× . . . αk−1× sk) ∈ RT2AB (δ) and, by the left part of the
implication, we have TKN , xα0× . . . αk−1× sk | C. We use the inductive hypothesis to obtain KN , ρ(xα0× . . . αk−1× sk) | C
which is the same as KN , sk | C; but sk = s and hence we get the contradiction.
The right to left implication follows analogous arguments. 
In the following we argue that the most important paradoxes of deontic logic are avoided in CL, either because they are
not expressible in the language or because they are excluded by the semantics.
Ross’s Paradox [41] in natural language it is expressed as: a. “It is obligatory that one mails the letter”; b. “It is obligatory that
one mails the letter or one burns the letter”. In SDL these are expressed as: a. O(p), b. O(p∨ q). The problem is that in SDL one
can make the inference O(p) → O(p ∨ q).
Remark 4.5. Ross’s paradox does not hold in CL.
Argumentation: Basically, Ross’s paradox says that it is counter intuitive to have O(a) → O(a+ b) (e.g., “Obligation to drink
implies obligation to drink or to kill”). In CL this inference is not possible as witnessed by Proposition 3.25(22).
The Good Samaritan Paradox [35] in natural language it is expressed as: a. “It ought to be the case that Jones helps Smithwho
has been robbed”; b. “It ought to be the case that Smith has been robbed”; and the natural inference c. “Jones helps Smith who
has been robbed if and only if Jones helps Smith and Smith has been robbed”. In SDL the first two are expressed as: a. O(p ∧ q),
b. O(q). The problem is that in SDL one can derive that O(p∧ q) → O(q)which is counter intuitive in the natural language.
Remark 4.6. The Good Samaritan paradox cannot be expressed in CL.
Argumentation : The Good Samaritan paradox uses ought-to-be and is more delicate to transform it into our ought-to-do
approach. The transformation looks like: ϕ → O(a) which means that “If Smith has been robbed (i.e., ϕ) then John is obliged
to help Smith (i.e., O(α))”. We cannot express in CL obligations over conjunction of two actions that are not performed
concurrently as this paradox is expressed in SDL. Also, with our representation of the paradox we cannot deduce ϕ; i.e., that
Smith has been robbed.
The Free Choice Permission Paradox [41] in natural language it is expressed as: a. “You may either sleep on the sofa or sleep
on the bed”; b. “You may sleep on the sofa and you may sleep on the bed”. In SDL this is: a. P(p∨ q), b. P(p)∧ P(q). The natural
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intuition tells that P(p ∨ q) → P(p) ∧ P(q). In SDL this leads to P(p) → P(p ∨ q) which is P(p) → P(p) ∧ P(q), so
P(p) → P(q). As an example: “If one is permitted something, then one is permitted anything”.
Remark 4.7. The Free Choice Permission paradox does not exist in CL.
Argumentation: The Free Choice Permission paradox basically says that from having one permission we may infer that we
have any permission. That is: P(a) → P(a+b) or P(a) → P(a)∧P(b). Neither of the two implications hold in our approach.
The second one is obvious. The first one is ruled out by Corollary 3.25-(27) which is a consequence of Proposition 3.24-(17).
Sartre’s Dilemma [25] in natural language is expressed as: a. It is obligatory to meet Jones now (as promised to Jones); b.
It is obligatory to not meet Jones now (as promised to Smith). In SDL this is: a. O(p), b. O(¬p). The problem is that in the
natural language the two obligations are intuitive and often happen, where the logical formulas are inconsistent when put
together (in conjunction) in SDL.
Remark 4.8. Sartre’s Dilemma is not expressible in our approach.
Argumentation : In CL we cannot write negation of actions, like not meet Jones, and thus cannot have obligations on top.
Thus, syntactically is not possible to write this paradox in CL. However, Sartre’s dilemma can be reformulated in contracts
terminology as: Obliged to meet John and Forbidden to meet John. This is written in CL as O(a) ∧ F(a)which is a well formed
formula. But this results in a contradiction because of Corollary 3.23-(12). In conclusion, neither this reformulation that can
be represented in CL does not constitute a paradox because the formula does not hold.
Chisholm’s Paradox [12] in natural language is expressed as: a. John ought to go to the party; b. If John goes to the party
then he ought to tell them he is coming; c. If John does not go to the party then he ought not to tell them he is coming; d.
John does not go to the party. In SDL these are expressed as: a. O(p), b. O(p → q), c. ¬p → O(¬q), d. ¬p. The problem is
that in SDL one can infer O(q) ∧ O(¬q) which is due to statement b.
Remark 4.9. The Chisholm’s paradox is avoided in CL.
Argumentation: The propositions of the Chisholm’s paradox are expressed in CL as: a. O(a), b. [a]O(b), c. [a]O(b). Note first
that formulas a. and c. give the CTD formula OC(a) of CLwhere C = O(b). The problem in SDL was that one may infer both
O(b) and O(b) holding in the sameworld. This is not our case because O(b) holds only after doing action a, where O(b) holds
only after doing the contradictory action a. Therefore, we cannot have in the same world both O(b) and O(b).
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the action-based contract logic CL. As our objective has been to present the theoretical
background of CL including its Kripke-like semantics and further results concerning the decidability of (fragments of) the
logic,we could not expandon applications. Case studies onhow touse CL forwriting specifications of contracts are presented
elsewhere (e.g., see [14,30]).
Concerning verification, an encoding of a variant of the logic presented here into NuSMV has been presented in [30],
while the papers [14,15] present the theory and a tool for conflict analysis. With the development of a Kripke semantics, we
are now in conditions to develop a specific model checker for CL.
Besides thedevelopmentofamodel checker, futurework includes thedevelopmentofaproof system, further investigation
on full decidability of the logic, the study of the use of CL as a semantic framework for other languages for services lacking
formal semantics, and an extensionwith real-time. The latter in particular is appealing asmost real contracts contain timing
constraints.
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Appendix A. Additional proofs
The following lemmas are helper results used in the proof of Theorem 3.21.
The following lemma guarantees that the conjunction of obligations implies equality between the structures of the
conjuncts, or strict inclusion of one into the other.
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Lemma A.1. If KN , i | OC(α) ∧ OC(β) then KT(α),imax = KT(β),imax otherwise KT(α),imax ⊂ KT(β),imax otherwise KT(α),imax ⊃ KT(β),imax .
Proof. Take an arbitrary pointed structure KN , i and suppose KN , i | OC(α)∧OC(β). The proof of this lemma uses reductio
ad absurdum and is based on the fact that lines two and three in the semantics of obligation add ◦ markers to the states, and
line four removes ◦ markers thus resulting in a contradiction.
If KN , i | OC(α) ∧ OC(β) then KN , i | OC(α) and KN , i | OC(β). From the first we have by the semantics that
T(α) S i KN whichmeans that there exists themaximal simulating structure KT(α),imax . From the semantics of OC(β)we obtain
similarly K
T(β),i
max . Both maximal simulating structures are substructures of the same K
N .
Suppose that there exists a transition k
γ−→ k′ ∈ KT(α),imax s.t. k γ−→ k′ ∈ KT(β),imax and there is a transition s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KT(β),imax
s.t. s
γ ′−→ s′ ∈ KT(α),imax . Without loss of generality we will work with the transition k γ−→ k′ which from the semantics of
OC(α) we have that ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then ◦a ∈ (k′). On the other hand the transition k γ−→ k′ is not part of KT(β),imax and
because k ∈ KT(β),imax and we know that it exists at least one transition in KT(β),imax (for example the transition s γ
′
−→ s′) then it
means that k
γ−→ k′ ∈ KT(β),irem . By the semantics of OC(β)we know that ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ then ◦a ∈ (k′). This results in a




max = KT(β),imax then
(a) TK
T(α),i
max = TKT(β),imax and
(b) K
T(α),i
rem = KT(β),irem .
b. If K
T(α),i
max ⊂ KT(β),imax then
(a) TK
T(α),i
max ⊂ TKT(β),imax and
(b) ∀k γ−→ k′ ∈KT(α),irem either k γ−→ k′ ∈KT(β),irem or k γ−→ k′ ∈KT(β),imax .
c. If K
T(α),i
max ⊃ KT(β),imax then
the same as before but interchange α with β .
Lemma A.3. For any α, β, γ ′, γ ′′ ∈ AD if T(α×γ ′) = T(β×γ ′′) = T then ∃γ ′′′ ∈ AD s.t. T = T(α×β×γ ′′′).
Proof. From the completeness result of the algebra of actions we get that because T(α × γ ′) = T(β × γ ′′) we have
α×γ ′ = β×γ ′′ = θ . We need to prove that ∃γ ′′′ ∈ AD s.t. α×β×γ ′′′ = θ = α×γ ′ = β×γ ′′ which by the completeness
results means that T = T(α×β×γ ′′′).
The interpretation function I is applied to the canonical almost normal form, and therefore we consider the actionsα×γ ′
and α×β×γ ′′′ to be in canf. Because the canonical form is defined inductively it is w.l.o.g. that we look only at the first
levels of the actions (i.e., only at the×-actions αi× of the canonical form). For a simple notation we denote the×-actions on
the first level of α by α1, α2, . . . , αk; note that there are k actions in total. For the action β we denote the×-actions on the
first level by β1, β2, . . . , βl . For the action θ we denote the×-actions by τi.
To prove the lemma we use the proof principle reductio ad absurdum and suppose that α×β×γ ′′′ = θ is the case.
According to the above this supposition is equivalent to saying that the×-actions on the first level of θ are not constructed
from the actions on the first level of α×β . This may be from several reasons.
First consider that a×-action of α×β , say α1×β1 is not contained in any of the×-actions τi on the first level of θ . Consider
τ iα1 to be those τi which contain α1; and similarly consider τ
j
β1
those τi which contain β1. From the supposition we know
that β1 does not appear in any of the τ
i
α1
; and similarly α1 does not appear in any τ
j
β1
. From the hypothesis θ = β×γ ′′ we
know that in all τ it appears one of the βj×-actions. This means that in each of the τ iα1 it appears one of the βj where j = 1.
Consider w.l.o.g. one of these actions τ 1α1 = α1×β2×γ for some γ which may also be empty. From the same hypothesis
θ = β×γ ′′ and knowing that α1×β2×γ is a×-action on the first level of θ then it means that α1γ is an action on the first
level of γ ′′. This means that between the actions τ of the first level of θ there exists each of the actions α1×γ ×βj with
j = 2 (because we already have the index 2). In other words, the action α1×γ must be combined with any of the actions βj
including β1.
We thus obtained the contradiction (i.e., there exists an action τ which contains α1×β1). Therefore, each of the αi×βj of
θ = α×β×γ ′′′ are contained in τi. In other words we have proven that all the×-actions on the first level of the action α×β
are found among the×-actions on the first level of θ . Moreover, the discussion above also proves that ∀τ ∈ θ, τ = αiβjγ ;
which says that there is no×-action on the first level of θ which does not contain an action from the first level of α×β .
The only way to still have the (bad) supposition is to say that it is not the case that for all pairs αiβj there exits a same γ
such that αi×βj×γ = τ is a×-action on the first level of θ . To explain it differently, this supposition wants to contradict
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the second×operator in the conclusion of the lemma (α×β)×γ ′′′ which by the definition it must be that for each γ an
action on the first level of γ ′′′ it must be combined with each action αi×βj of α×β .
We take an arbitrary pair αi×βj , say α1×β1 and w.l.o.g. suppose it has some extra action γ×which may be also empty.
Thus α1×β1×γ× is an action on the first level of θ . From the hypothesis β×γ ′′ = θ and knowing that β1 is combined with
the action α1×γ× it implies that all other βj with j = 1 must be combined with the same action. Therefore, the following
are also actions τ : α1×β2×γ×, . . . , α1×βn′′ ×γ×. On the other hand, from the hypothesis α×γ ′ = θ and knowing that
α1×β1×γ× is a τ action it means that all other αi actions must be combined with β1×γ×. Therefore, we also have as τ
actions: α2×β1×γ×, . . . , αk×β1×γ×.
We continue to apply recursively the same reasoning on the new deduced actions like α2×β1×γ and we obtain in the
end that all the actions αk×βl appear among the actions τ on the first level of θ combined with the same action γ×. Thus,
the second false supposition is contradicted.
The last way of contradicting the lemma is trivial and it supposes that it is not the case that all the τ actions of θ come
from combination by×with the actions αi×βj . More clearly this tries to say that there exit other τ actions that do not
follow the pattern deduced by the first two reasonings we had before. This cannot be as if there were another action besides
αi×βj×γ×, say τ ′ we have proven by contradicting the first supposition that this must be of the form αi×βj×γ ′× and by the
second supposition we again get that there exist all the αi×βj×γ ′× as actions τ on the first level of θ .
The proof of the lemma is finished, as the bad supposition is always contradicted. 
Lemma A.4. For any KN a normative structure and α, β two distinct actions we have that if KN , i | OC(α) ∧ OC(β) then
T(α×β) S i KN .
Proof. We use Lemma A.3 and mainly the naturalness constraint on obligations from Definition 3.19.
From the statement of the lemma KN , i | OC(α) ∧ OC(β) by applying the Lemma A.1 we get that KT(α),imax = KT(β),imax
(we treat the two cases with strict inclusion at the end). This implies (see Corollary A.2) that the corresponding trees which
unfold these maximal substructures are the same; i.e., TK
T(α),i
max = TKT(β),imax = TKNmax .
Moreover, from the hypothesis of the lemmawe get that KN , i | OC(α) and KN , i | OC(β). Considering the naturalness
constraint it implies that:
∃γ ′ s.t. T(α×γ ′) = TKT(α),imax
∃γ ′′ s.t. T(β×γ ′′) = TKT(β),imax .
From these and knowing that themaximal simulating structures are the sameweget that T(α×γ ′) = T(β×γ ′′) = TKmax .
By applying the Lemma A.3 we get that TKmax = T(α×β×γ ′′′).
Following the Definition 3.3 of the simulation relation S i , in order to prove the conclusion T(α×β) S i KN we need to
prove that:
(1) ∀r γ−→ t′ ∈ T(α×β), ∃i γ
′
−→ k′ ∈ KN s.t. γ ⊆ γ ′ and t′ S k′,
(2) ∀i γ
′
−→ k′ ∈ KN with γ ⊆ γ ′ then t′ S k′.
Using the resultsof theprevious lemmas theproofsof (1) and (2)becomesimple.AsT(α×β×γ ′′′) = TKNmaxwhich is the tree
unfolding of the substructure KNmax = KT(α),imax = KT(β),imax of KN , then it is simple to see that for any edge r
γ−→ t′ ∈ T(α×β)
there is a transition i
γ ′−→ k′ ∈ TKNmax which clearly γ ⊆ γ ′ depending on γ ′′′. Therefore, i
γ ′−→ k′ ∈ KNmax and thus
i
γ ′−→ k′ ∈ KN . The fact that t′ S k′ is true is obvious by applying a similar recursive reasoning and descending one level in
the tree. Note that the recursive reasoning stops when the tree node t′ has no more children (i.e., no more edges t′ γ−→ t′′
exist in T(α×β)); and this is always the case as the tree is finite.
For proving (2) we use a similar recursive reasoning as before. From the condition γ ⊆ γ ′ it implies that γ ′ = γ ×γ ′′.
Because γ ′ is a label of a transition in T(α×β×γ ′′′) then γ ′ = α×β×γ ′′′× ×γ ′′ which because it contains α it enters under
the application of the hypothesis T(α) S i KN (and similarly because it contains β we can apply T(β) S i KN ). Applying the
hypothesis leads to the fact there are the edges r
γ−→ t′α ∈ T(α) and r
γ−→ t′β ∈ T(β)with t′α S k′ and t′β S k′. On the other
hand t′ comes from the combination of the two t′α and t′β and thus a simple recursive reasoning gives t′ S k′. The recursive
reasoning stops again when the node t′ has no more children.
Note that if we consider inclusion among the maximal simulating structures (instead of the equality as we did) then the
discussion above does not change. The TK
T(α×β),i
max is the same as the interpretation T(α×β×γ ′′′). 
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In what follows we present two corollaries of Lemmas A.1 and A.4: the first shows what is the maximal simulating
structure with respect to T(α×β); and the second states that the obligation of α×β respects the naturalness constraint.
Corollary A.5 is used in the proofs of both Lemma A.7 and Lemma A.8.
Corollary A.5. For anyKN anormative structure andα, β twodistinct actionswehave that if KN , i | OC(α)∧OC(β) then either
K
T(α),i
max = KT(β),imax = KT(α×β),imax or
K
T(α),i
max ⊂ KT(β),imax = KT(α×β),imax or
K
T(β),i
max ⊂ KT(α),imax = KT(α×β),imax .
Corollary A.6. If KN , i | OC(α) ∧ OC(β) then O(α×β) is a natural obligation.
Lemma A.7. If KN , i | OC(α) ∧ OC(β) then
∀t γ−→ t′ ∈T(α×β) and ∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈KN s.t. t S s ∧ γ ⊆γ ′ is the case that
∀a∈AB if a∈γ then ◦a ∈ (s′).
Proof. It is simple to see, by looking at Definition 3.4, that all transitions s
γ ′−→ s′ mentioned in the lemma make up exactly
the maximal simulating structure K
T(α×β),i
max . By Corollary A.5 this is the same as the maximal simulating structures for T(α)
and T(β).
To finish the proof we take one arbitrary edge t
α××β×−→ t′ ∈T(α×β) and one arbitrary transition s γ−→ s′ ∈KT(α×β),imax s.t. t S s
and γ = α××β××γ ′ where γ ′ may also be 1. These satisfy the conditions in the lemma. The edge t α××β×−→ t′ comes from the
combination of two edges t
α×−→ t′ ∈ T(α) and t β×−→ t′ ∈ T(β). On the other hand we have for the transition s γ−→ s′ that
both α× ⊆ γ and β× ⊆ γ hold. This means that we can apply the hypothesis of the lemma (i.e., apply the definition for OC
to both OC(α) and OC(β)) to get that ◦a ∈ (s′),∀a ∈ α× and ◦a ∈ (s′),∀a ∈ β× (because the definition says that for all
transitions this happens). This implies the result of the lemma, i.e., ◦a ∈ (s′),∀a ∈ α××β×. 
Lemma A.8. If KN , i | OC(α) ∧ OC(β) then
∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KT(α×β),irem then ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ ′ then ◦a ∈ (s′).
Proof. Following from Corollary A.5 is that K
T(α×β),i
rem = KT(α),irem = KT(β),irem (the cases for inclusion are treated at the end).
From the hypothesis KN , i | OC(α) we have that ∀s γ
′
−→ s′ ∈ KT(α),irem then ∀a ∈ AB if a ∈ γ ′ then ◦a ∈ (s′) which makes
our proof goal also true by replacing K
T(α),i
rem with its equal K
T(α×β),i
rem .
In the case when K
T(α),i
max ⊂ KT(β),imax = KT(α×β),imax then we work as before but consider the structure for β instead. 
Lemma A.9. If KN , i | OC(α) ∧ OC(β) then
KN , s | C ∀s ∈ N with t Ss s ∧ t ∈ leafs(T(α×β)).
Proof. The conclusion of the lemma should be read as: the formula C holds in all those states s ∈ KN which can be reached
by “following” the tree interpretation of the action complementα×β to the leafs. By “to follow”wemean that the normative
structure simulates strictly the tree T(α×β). The simulation must be strict so that we follow exactly the tree.
Recall the Definition 2.7 of the action complement. The complement of a compound action α works on each level of the
complemented action α. For the proof of this lemma it is enough to look at the behavior for only the first level, and for
the rest we apply a similar recursive reasoning. Moreover, note that we need to look only at the leafs of the trees (i.e., at
the states from the end of the final paths of the tree interpretation of the complemented action). Thus, the first level in the
complement contains the choice +γ∈R γ (defining the full branches; we look at the other full branches when we reason
recursively at lower levels of the tree).
Thus, we need to prove that ∀t γ−→ t′ ∈ T(+γ∈R γ ) with γ ∈ A×B a×-action s.t. ∀αi××β j× a×-action on the first level
of the tree of the complemented action α×β we have that αi××β j× ⊆ γ then it is the case that if ∃s
γ−→ s′ ∈ KN then
KN , s′ | C. Take an arbitrary transition t γ−→ t′ for which the above hold and for which ∃s γ−→ s′ ∈ KN and we show that
KN , s′ | C.
From the condition ∀αi××β j×, αi××β j× ⊆ γ we can conclude that either ∀αi×, αi× ⊆ γ or ∀β j×, β j× ⊆ γ . This is done by
using the proof principle reductio ad absurdum and we suppose that neither of the ∀αi×, αi× ⊆ γ nor ∀β j×, β j× ⊆ γ hold.
C. Prisacariu, G. Schneider / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 81 (2012) 458–490 489
This means that ∃i′, j′ s.t. αi′× ⊆ γ ∧ β j
′
× ⊆ γ which implies that αi′××β j
′
× ⊆ γ . By looking again at the definition of the
×operation we see that αi′××β j
′
× must be an action among the αi××β j×. Therefore, the conclusion that we have just drawn
before enters into contradiction with the initial condition ∀αi××β j×, αi××β j× ⊆ γ .
By using one of the hypothesis of the lemma, say KN , i | OC(α)we conclude from the definition of the semantics of OC
that the transition that we work with t
γ−→ t′ respects the fact that ∀αi×, αi× ⊆ γ and thus in the end state of the transition
s
γ−→ s′ ∈ KN we have KN , s′ | C. This is the conclusion of the lemma. 
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